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A Dialogue on England: The England




In this fictitious dialogue, between two students of the law, on the
abstention doctrine and its effect upon federal jurisdiction, Mr. Lieben-
that examines relevant Supreme Court decisions and explains how they
have been affected by the England case. First, the author demonstrates
that apparent inconsistencies between England and earlier decisions arise
from the fact that several of the latter did not involve "true" absten-
tion situations. Second, it is shown that the conflict generated by the
simultaneous applicability of the abstention doctrine, the principles of
res judicata, and the rule of Erie v. Tompkins to a particular case pre-
cludes strict adherence to any one of them and necessitates flexibility if
the ends of federal jurisdiction are to be attained. Finally, Mr. Lieben-
thal suggests that many of the problems caused by the invocation of the
abstention doctrine in cases involving diversity of citizenship or a fed-
eral question could be eliminated by the use of inter-jurisdictional certi-
fication by federal courts of appeal.
6 "' _A.M STILL NOT SURE that I understand exactly when a court
should or should not, or must or must not abstain. Could
we go over that subject in greater detail?"
"I do not think reexamining that here would be of much help.
The law reviews have done an
excellent job on the subject,
ThE AUTHOR (B.B.A., Western Reserve and a reading of a few of them
University, J.D., University of Chicago) should suffice to answer your
is a practicing attorney in Cleveland,
Ohio, and is a member of the Ohio State questions.1  Let me say, how-
Bar Association. ever, that the courts themselves
also appear to be in your posi-
tion; they are not very dear on the matter either
"For our present purposes let us examine some of the facets of
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners3 and the prob-
lems it presents."
1 See generally Gowen & Izlar, Federal Court Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship
Litigation, 43 TsxAs L. REv. 194 (1964); Wright, The Abstentiou Doctrine Recon-
sidered, 37 TEAS L REV. 815 (1959); Note, Judicial Abstention From the Exercise
of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 CoLuM. L. REV. 749 (1959); Note, Consequences of Ab-
stention by a Federal Court, 73 HARv. L REv. 1358 (1960); Note, Federal Abstention
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I. Burford AND Alabama: CASES NOT REPRESENTING
APPLICATION OF THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
"Very well, for England certainly does present some problems.
First, why did Mr. Justice Brennan immediately make an exception
for cases like Burford v. Sun Oil Co.' and Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern Ry.' from his sweeping statement of a litigant's
and Its Relation to the Erie Doctrine, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 72 (1964); Note, Abstention: An
Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 226 (1959); Note, The Abstention Doc-
trine: A Problem of Federalism, 17 V-,D. L. REV. 1246 (1964); Note, Judicial Ab-
stention in the Federal Courts - Its Origin, Purposes and Application, 65 W. VA. L.
REV. 209 (1963); Note, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of
Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964); Note, Louisiana Power &
Light v. Thibodaux: The Abstention Doctrine Expanded, 69 YALE L.J. 643 (1960).
2 See American Universal Ins. Co. v. Chauvin, 329 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cit. 1964),
where the court stated that "when to abstain and how we are to go about it is certainly
no easy matter"; United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964).
See also Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125 (1st Cit. 1962); Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cit. 1962), rev'd on rehearing, 325 F.2d 673
(5th Cit. 1963); B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Torgerson, 234 F. Supp. 214 (D. Mont.
1964); A.F.L. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Wis.
1960). These cases involved abstention in diversity situations and where only a doubt-
ful state law question existed. Abstention was granted in Green, Delaney, Miner, and
Torgerson; approved but not ordered in A.P.L. Motors because the court felt that there
was sufficient time to reach the merits after a decision was rendered in the state court;
and denied in Chauvin. There is a consensus that abstention is improper in such
situations. See articles cited note 1 supra and text accompanying notes 95-152 infra.
See also Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cit. 1963) and Beiersdorf
& Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951). These cases involve the propriety
of abstention where jurisdiction is based upon a federal question.
3 375 U.S. 411 (1964). In England, the appellants were chiropractors who sought
to practice in Louisiana without complying with the educational requirements of the
Louisiana Medical Practice Act, IA. REV. STAT. §§ 1261-90 (1950). They contended
that the act was unconstitutional as applied to them because of the nature of their pro-
fession. The district court abstained and remitted the parties to the state courts on the
ground that a decision that the act does not apply to chiropractors might end the con-
troversy. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled adversely to appellants, and the district
court dismissed their appeal on the ground that the supreme court's decision was res
judicata. The Court reversed and ordered the district court to decide the constitutional
questions involved. 375 U.S. at 411-12.
4 319 U.S. 315 (1943). This case involved an attempt by the Sun Oil Company
to enjoin as a violation of due process the execution of an order of the Railroad Com-
mission of Texas by which Burford and others had been granted permission to drill
and operate four oil wells. The district court dismissed the complaint, the court of ap-
peals reversed, and the Supreme Court vacated the reversal and affirmed the dismissal
on the ground that the Texas courts should have an opportunity to first decide the
questions involved. Id. at 316-18.
r 341 U.S. 341 (1951). In Alabama, the Railway Company applied to the Alabama
Public Service Commission for permission to discontinue service on two of its trains be-
cause they were operating at a substantial loss. The application was denied. Instead of
appealing the Commission's order to the state courts as provided by statute, the appellee
Railway Company filed a complaint in the federal district court alleging that enforce-
ment of the order would result in irreparable injury. The court granted the injunction,
but the Supreme Court reversed because of appellee's failure to show that the established
procedure for reviewing commission orders was inadequate.
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right to have a federal court pass on his properly presented federal
questions?"'
"The simple answer to your question is that Burford, Alabama,
and their progenies can be distinguished from what may be termed
'true' abstention cases such as Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.' In
fact, it may be said that cases of the former type are not - let me
repeat, are not - really abstention cases at all."
"If Alabama and Burford are not abstention cases at all, then
have we been wasting our time?"
"No, it certainly is useful to examine and schematize these cases
carefully in order to attempt to ascertain in what situations the
courts should follow these decisions. I merely contend that such
schematization is not strictly pertinent to an analysis of cases like
Pullman - 'true' abstention cases, if you will. This will demon-
strate why Mr. Justice Brennan made the exception he did and, fur-
ther, why such an exception is justified. Let me explain."
"Proceed."
"You will recall that the abstention doctrine, as it was estab-
lished in Pullman and as we have considered it, is based on the
following considerations. First, by awaiting a state court determi-
nation of the state law question, state law will be authoritatively
determined, and, second, a decision on federal constitutional ques-
tions may be obviated! In Burford, while noting that jurisdiction
was based on diversity and the presence of a federal question,9
the Court said nothing about avoiding the constitutional question
nor made any further reference to its existence and placed only
6 375 U.S. at 415 n.5.
7 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In Pulhnan, the Railroad Commission of Texas issued an
order which required all sleeping cars operated in that state to be in the continuous charge
of an employee having the rank and position of pullman conductor. The Pullman Com-
pany and other railroads sought to enjoin enforcement of the order in a federal district
court as unauthorized by Texas law and violative of the due process, equal protection,
and commerce clauses of the federal constitution. The court granted the injunction,
but the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the complainants had not shown
that the remedies available to them in the Texas courts were inadequate for the purpose
of deciding the constitutional questions presented. Id. at 496-98.8 Whether both factors are necessary for abstention, or the existence of a doubtful
state law question alone is sufficient is unclear. See cases cited note 2 supra.
9 319 U.S. at 317.
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minimal reliance on the uncertainty of state law."° Rather, the
Court stressed the deference due the formation of state policies in re-
lation to the complexities of the oil industry and relied on three basic
factors: the non-legal complexities involved in the Commission's
orders; the fact that review of such orders had been concentrated in
one state court to avoid the confusion inherent in multi-court review;
and the history of disruption of the state's regulatory scheme by fed-
eral equitable interference. Thus the decision was based on the
undesirability of a federal court's interfering in a unified state
scheme relative to a highly complex industry and regulated by an
expert administrative agency."
"But the fact that equitable considerations were stressed does not
distinguish Burford from Pullman, for equitable considerations were
also stressed in Pullman. In fact, such considerations were empha-
sized in Pullman even more than the two basic abstention factors
mentioned previously. Furthermore, does not the existence of doubt-
ful state law issues as well as a constitutional question in Burford,
even if not stressed by the Court, make the decision easily explain-
able in terms of the Pullman 'true' abstention rule?"
"Yes, but the fact that the Court did not stress these 'true' absten-
tion factors cannot be so easily put aside. The Court had twice be-
fore dealt with the Commission and the Texas oil industry. The
Burford decision and the rationale used by the majority follow quite
realistically from the prior decisions in Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan
& Nichols Oil Co.," both of which involved the same parties and
the scope of review a federal court should exercise in passing on the
validity of an oil proration order of the Commission challenged as
violative of due process. In reversing the two lower courts which
had enjoined the orders, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, took the position that all doubts were to be resolved in
favor of the expert administrative agency in a federal court action to
enjoin its orders as violating the fourteenth amendment and that
such orders were not to be enjoined if there was any reasonable basis
for them. The Court in Burford cited the decisions in Rowan &
Nichols a number of times' and, of special importance, noted that
'Old. at 331.
"1 These decisions can be found at 310 U.S. 573 (1940) and 311 U.S. 570 (1941).
12 319 U.S. at 318-19, 323, 330-32.
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the federal-state conflict which had been lessened appreciably by
those decisions should not be permitted to begin again.""3
"But Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a strong dissent in Burford
on the basis that the Court was abrogating diversity jurisdiction.
Does not this factor, that is, that the Rowan & Nichols cases were
based on federal question jurisdiction and Burford, at least partially,
was based on diversity jurisdiction, make the cases dearly distin-
guishable? Moreover, does not the fact that Mr. Justice Frankfurter
wrote for the Court in one case and against it in the other make your
argument that Burford was based on the Rowan & Nichols cases
somewhat tenuous?"
"I cannot answer for Mr. Justice Frankfurter's inconsistencies, of
course, but it does seem that, given his position in the Rowan &
Nichols cases, his position in Burford is somewhat difficult to under-
stand, much less justify. The Rowan & Nichols cases certainly indi-
cate that the federal courts were not to interfere with the Commis-
sion's orders as they related to the oil industry when jurisdiction was
based upon a federal question. The Burford case simply advances
this 'hands-off' policy by enunciating the same principle for cases in
which federal jurisdiction is predicated on diversity."
"I see that if it is undesirable for a federal court to interfere with
the Commission's expert administrative control when jurisdiction is
based on the existence of a federal question, it certainly would seem
a fortiori that it would be undesirable to do so when jurisdiction is
predicated on the accident of diversity. I understand now the differ-
ences between Burford and Pullman, but I still fail to see why such
an action should be dismissed. What general principle makes the
England rule inapplicable to a case like Burford? And what about
Alabama? It was not based on any prior cases, nor did it contain
the factors on which Burford was based."
"For now let me state that Burford may be said to be simply an
example of the broad equitable principle of comity - leaving to a
state the determination of its own policies. Let us examine Alabama
before attempting to answer your questions more thoroughly, and I
think my last statement will become dearer."
"Fine. More clarity would certainly be appreciated, for I am
13 Id. at 331-32.
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not yet convinced that cases like Burford and Alabama are really
any different from what you call 'true' abstention cases."
"Alabama was not, and as a matter of fact, could not have been
based on the Pullman-type abstention cases, for there was involved
no doubtful state law question and no means of avoiding the consti-
tutional question. This was explicitly recognized by the lower court
when it refused to apply the doctrine, pointing out that the case in-
volved no undecided state law question requiring an authoritative
determination and that since neither the authority of the Commis-
sion nor the statute under which it acted was being challenged, no
state court decision could eliminate the necessity for the court to pass
on the constitutional question.'4 My conclusion is further sup-
ported by the fact that the Supreme Court itself expressly disclaimed
the applicability of traditional Pullman-type abstention cases. 5 This
pretty well does away with any basis for supporting Alabama on
'true' abstention grounds."
"Well, I will have to grant you that. But then, since Alabama
involved none of the factors underlying Burford such as a unified
scheme for regulation of a complex industry (the regulation of the
oil industry being more complex than that imposed on the railroad
industry) or a history of confusion arising from federal review of
administrative orders of the type challenged, upon what does the
case rest and how can it be equated with Burford?"
"My answer to both questions is the traditional equity principle
of comity stated before. Let us examine the two opinions and deci-
sions and see what they did have in common. Two factors stand out
as fundamentally stressed in both opinions. The first is the rela-
tionship established between the state court and the state agency in
the statutory provisions for review by that court of the agency's or-
ders. In Burford the state court and agency were spoken of as
'working partners, ' and in Alabama the state judicial review pro-
cedure was called an 'integral part of the regulatory process."7  In
both cases, the Court felt that this relationship was an important
enough aspect of the state legislative determination to leave to the
34 Southern Ry. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 91 F. Supp. 980, 985-86 (M.D.
Ala. 1950).
15 341 U.S. at 344.
16 319 U.S. at 326.
'7 341 U.S. at 348.
[Vol. 18: 157
A DIALOGUE ON ENGLAND
agency the task of formulating the state's regulatory scheme and
that for a federal court to interfere with this process would obstruct
the state's formulation of its own policies.
"The second factor has two aspects: the scrupulous regard which
the federal courts should maintain in reference to the independence
of the states and the states' right to determine their own policies and
the need to guard the overall public interest against the extraordi-
nary relief of an injunction when private interests will not suffer
by so withholding it. 8 Thus Burford and Alabama are merely ex-
amples of the traditional equity cases concerned primarily with the
propriety of equitable relief in a given situation in which the Court
places great emphasis on the factor of federal-state harmony. The
confusion with 'true' abstention arises from the fact that the Court
in cases like Burford and Alabama declines to exercise jurisdiction
on equitable grounds because there is another system available to
afford the requested relief; and although it may appear that the fed-
eral court is abstaining, actually it is simply deciding that it will not
grant the relief requested."
'You do not mean, do you, that Burford and Alabama authorize
a federal court to decline jurisdiction in equity matters whenever
there is adequate state relief available? Surely Mr. Justice Frank-
furter was correct, was he not, in saying in Alabama that the grant
of federal jurisdiction is in itself evidence that Congress felt that the
availability of adequate state relief is not sufficient to protect the in-
terests that federal jurisdiction is supposed to protect and that to hold
otherwise would be to destroy federal jurisdiction in equity cases?"'"
"I certainly did not mean to imply that the availability of ade-
quate state relief alone is sufficient to justify a federal court in de-
dining to exercise its equity jurisdiction, nor do I think the majority
in Alabama or Burford meant to either. Rather, the Court was say-
ing that other factors - such as the importance of state indepen-
dence in formulating policies of state regulatory schemes and
establishment of special review procedures to ensure consistent for-
mulation of such policies - in connection with the factor of the
available state relief being adequate to protect the private interests
18 319 U.S. at 317-18; 341 U.S. at 349-51. In both cases, the Court was quite
careful to point out that review adequate to protect the petitioners' federal rights was
dearly available in the state courts.
19 341 U.S. at 360-62 (concurring opinion).
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involved in the particular case outweigh the need for federal juris-
diction in that particular case and that equity has always had the
power to decline jurisdiction under such circumstances. In short,
adequate state relief is a necessary but not a sufficient precondition
for declining jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was certainly cor-
rect in his statement, but his statement arose only because he
disagreed with the Court on the existence in Alabama of these other
factors."0 And even though I tend to agree with him that these
other factors did not exist in the case to the extent necessary in order
to justify the majority's position, its action was, nonetheless, based
on finding that these other factors did exist.2 Thus Burford and
Alabama, like abstention itself, are based on the idea that other fac-
tors can, in a given situation, make a state remedy adequate. The
point is that the factors which make the state remedy adequate are
different in Burford and Alabama-type cases from those in absten-
tion cases."
"I think I am beginning to see your point. You are saying, are
you not, that the Court in Burford and Alabama felt that comity re-
quired the federal courts, within their equity discretion, to decline to
interfere with state policies or the system established by the state for
the formulation of its policies when adequate relief is afforded
through the state courts?"
"Exactly. The doctrine used in Burford and Alabama is no
more than the doctrine which the Court had used before: No equity
court will unnecessarily give extraordinary equitable relief, even
though that court has jurisdiction to do so.22 Once you understand
that this is the position the Court took, the reason for dismissal is
easily explained."
"Once the Court has decided to deny the relief requested, having
decided that such relief would be extraordinary and unnecessary un-
der the circumstances, there is no reason for jurisdiction to be
retained."
201,d. at 360.
21 Id. at 344-48.
22 See Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935), cited by Mr. Justice Doug-
las, concurring in Burford, 319 U.S. at 334-35, in which the Court declined jurisdiction
in a case involving an insolvent building and loan association where the state court
procedure for supervision of liquidations was deemed adequate. See also Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943), from which the Court quoted
in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1951), a case
turning on the federal court's withholding of extraordinary equitable relief and where
the Court sanctioned dismissal of the complaint.
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"Exactly right again. And this further highlights the difference
between these cases and Pullman. In Pullman-type cases the relief
requested is not the controlling factor. Rather, in such cases, the
plaintiff is required to justify the granting of relief by first having
preliminary questions answered in the state courts in order to estab-
lish the necessity for the federal court to decide the question or ques-
tions on which depend the granting of the federal relief in the first
place. Burford and Alabama, on the other hand, hold that con-
textually the requested relief cannot be justified in the circumstances
presented, and thus will not be granted at all."
"Well, you have almost convinced me. But there is one more
item with which you must deal to convince me completely. First,
will you concede that Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po2" and Mar-
tin v. Creas94 are Pullman-type abstention cases?"
"Yes."
"Now, remember I said I had a question concerning the disposi-
tion point, and here it is: if one of the factors distinguishing Burford
and Alabama from 'true' abstention cases is that the former result
in dismissal, whereas cases like Pullman result in retention, how
can you justify the dismissals in Stainback and Martin, both of
which you concede to be Pullman-type cases?"
"Unfortunately, I cannot justify the dismissals in those cases. I
simply think that dismissal was incorrect in Stainback25 and Martin
and that this is especially so in light of the England rule."
'"rhen you think England overrules Martin and Stainback?"
"To the extent that they can be read to justify dismissal in
'true' abstention cases, yes. Both cases presented abstention situa-
23 336 U.S. 368 (1949).
24360 U.S. 219 (1959).
25 Perhaps the exception which proves the rule, that the doctrine of abstention
involves merely a postponement and not an abdication of federal jurisdiction,
is Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lock [sic) Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949). There dis-
missal of the complaint was ordered, rather than retention of jurisdiction
pending a state construction of the statute. The Court did not explain why
it ordered this different treatment of the case, and it seems quite inconsistent
with the theory which underlies abstention in this class of cases. Probably
1966]
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tions identical to that in England, that is, the challenge to a statute
found to present a doubtful state law question on federal constitu-
ional grounds.26 Thus there is no reason why the 'fundamental ob-
jections to any conclusion that a litigant who has properly invoked
the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal consti-
tutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and through
no fault of his own, to accept instead a state court's determination
of those claims,'27 were not equally applicable to the parties in
Stainback and Martin as they were to those in England. Further-
more, the statement in Martin that Supreme Court review is always
available if the petitioners feel that the state courts have deprived
them of their constitutional rights28 is directly contrary to the Eng-
land declaration that such review is not an adequate substitute for
an initial district court determination." 9
"Your point is well taken, and my question has been sufficiently
answered. May I commend you: I have been convinced."
H. THE England RULE AND RES JUDICATA
"So, in a true abstention case, the federal court will retain juris-
diction, pending the state court's determination of the state law
questions. And it would appear that England commands this re-
sult, given the emphasis on the litigant's right to a federal determin-
ation of his federal question. But suppose the state court does
decide the federal question, even though the plaintiff has properly
reserved it. What good does retention do then?"
"Before answering your question, perhaps I should say a word
about the purposes of retention. Obviously, the primary purpose
is to enable the federal court to proceed with the action if the state
court decision on state law does not avoid the necessity of answering
the decision should be regarded as a sport. Wright, supra note 1, at 816-17
n.8. (Emphasis added.)
26 In Stajnback, the Court equated the right of a territorial court to authoritatively
interpret a territorial law with that of a state court to do so with a state law. 336
U.S. at 383.
27 England v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964).
28 "If, after all is said and done in the Pennsylvania courts, any of the plaintiffs
believe that the Commonwealth has deprived them of their property without due process
of law, this Court will be here." 360 U.S. at 225.
29 "[S]uch review [in the Supreme Court], even when available by appeal rather
than only by discretionary writ of certiorari, is an inadequate substitute for the initial
District Court determination ... to which the litigant is entitled in the federal courts."
375 U.S. at 416.
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the constitutional questions. But retention also serves another func-
tion, and that is to protect the plaintiff against irreparable injury
from unreasonable delay in state court relief. Abstaining courts
have often spoken of this latter factor."
"As to your question, England itself answers it. The only way
a litigant can lose his right to return to the federal court is by volun-
tarily litigating his federal claim in the state court' If the state
court compels him to litigate his federal claim there, then of course
such litigation would not be voluntary, and thus the litigant would
not have lost his right to return to the federal court."8
"But suppose one of the parties fully litigates the federal ques-
don and the state court answers it?"
"Mr Justice Brennan dealt with this also by saying that the
other party can refuse to argue the question or argue it with the
proper reservation."3  Another possibility would be for the federal
court to enjoin the parties from litigating the federal question in the
state court. Since the basic purpose of retention is to maintain juris-.
diction over federal issues, it seems that the federal court could
invoke its statutory power to enjoin parties from proceeding in state
courts 'where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.' 4
"But it seems to me that a state court might object to being
denied the right to decide the constitutional question, especially
where it concerns one of the state's own statutes. I recognize, of
course, that as Mr. Justice Brennan asserts, should the state court
agree to answer the state law question only if the plaintiff agrees to
fully litigate his constitutional question, the district court would
have to vacate its abstention order and answer both questions itself.3 5
Nevertheless, based upon my initial assumption it does not seem un-
reasonable to conclude that a state court would take this attitude.
S0 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959); Shipman
v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321, 322 (1950); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
502 (1941).
31375 U.S. at 421-22.
32Id. at 421 n.12.
331d. at 422 n.13.
34 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 491-92 (1949),
so intimating in dictum. However, the power has never been exercised in this context.
For a discussion of the scope of the statute see Note, Federal Power To Enjoin State
Court Proceedings, 74 HAnv. L REV. 726 (1961).
3 375 U.S. at 421 n.12.
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Now, in light of the fact that abstention is designed not only to serve
the states in reserving to them the authoritative interpretation of
their own laws but also to enable the federal courts to avoid consti-
tutional questions, is there any way the federal court can force the
state court to answer only the state questions?"
"This is difficult to answer and involves a great deal more than
we have time for here, so my response must be somewhat inadequate.
Suffice to say that it has been argued that the federal courts lack
power to prevent the state courts from deciding the federal issues;36
therefore, in light of these authorities, I would have to answer your
question in the negative."
"Suppose, then, that the parties have been enjoined from raising
the federal question and have merely presented it with proper reser-
vation as England requires, but the state court nevertheless answers
the question. What would be the result?"
"Mr. Justice Brennan conceded this possibility and indicated that
the district court would be permitted to redetermine the federal
issues." '
"Oh, I see. What about res judicata and section 1738?""S
"You have made my reply much easier by the way you posed
your original question. As was noted in Propper v. Clark,"9 the use
of an injunction against the parties would be for the very purpose of
preventing the operation of res judicata. It certainly would be inap-
propriate to apply res judicata where the parties never had the op-
portunity to raise their federal questions because of the injunction.
And once the state court has ignored the injunction, thus itself vio-
lating the principle of comity which was one of the factors which
fostered the abstention in the first place, the federal court certainly
need not be constrained further by such notions which might have
weighed against violating the normal rules of res judicata."
86See 68 HARV. L. REV. 544 (1955); 1 STAN. L. R1v. 551 (1949).
37 375 U.S. at 421. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1963).
8828 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964) requires a federal court to give the same effect to a
state court judgment that it would receive in another court in that state. Basically, it
is a codification of the common law doctrine of res judicata.
89 337 U.S. 472, 491-92 (1949).
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"All right, suppose that there were no injunction, that the parties
properly reserved the federal question, and that the state court still
answers it. Now what?"
"Very well - Let us see what the courts have done with this
problem. Although Propper suggested that res judicata would
apply in abstention situations in the absence of an injunction,40
it seems that this view was rejected in the Tribune Publishing
Co. v. Thomas4 decisions. After the federal court had abstained,
the parties presented and argued all their claims, state and federal,
to the state court, which rejected them' After the Supreme Court
denied certiorari,48 the plaintiffs returned to the district court, again
asserting their federal claims, which were reexamined by that court.
It assumed the state decision and held that the denial of certiorari -
since it did not purport to be an adjudication on the merits - was
not res judicata as to the federal issues.44 The court of appeals af-
firmed,4" declaring that the state determination 'settles the question
so far as concerns ... state law,'4  but apparently agreed that the
state courts could not settle the federal issues, and thus their decision
on them was not to be given res judicata effect."
"Am I right in assuming the Tribune decisions would be over-
40 Ibid.
41These decisions can be found at 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957), affd, 254
F.2d 883 (3d Cit. 1958) and at 120 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
421; re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002
(1957). Prior to this action, which was an appeal from a contempt conviction for a
violation of the court rule which the plaintiffs were challenging as unconstitutional, the
state supreme court had denied the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of prohibition against
the lower court's enforcement of the rule. Application of Tribune Review Publishing
Co., 379 Pa. 92, 113 A.2d 861 (1954) (per curiam).
A by-product of this decision became a cause cl6bbre in Pennsylvania. The
decision, unanimous when rendered, came at the end of the court's term.
After the justices had all gone home, Mr. Justice Musmanno wrote and filed a
dissenting opinion, without informing his brethren. When the State Re-
porter refused to publish the opinion, the justice brought a mandamus action
to compel publication. He lost the case, but only after demanding that the
entire supreme court disqualify itself for bias, and arguing before that court
in propria persona. Musmanno v. Eldredge, I Pa. D. & C.2d 535 (C.P.
Dauphin County) (per curiam), aff'd per curiam, 382 Pa. 167, 114 A.2d
511 (1955). Note, 73 HARv. L REv. 1358, 1366 n.51 (1960).
4 8Mack v. Pennsylvania, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957).
44 Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957),
aff'd, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958).
45 Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958).
46Id. at 885.
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ruled by England, the plaintiff having presented and fully litigated
his federal question in the state courts and that you are using the case
only to demonstrate court reaction to the problem of res judicata
and abstention?"
"Yes."
"Well, as an aside, do you think the Pennsylvania district court's
reasoning as to the effect of the denial of certiorari is sound? And
what happens if Supreme Court review is by appeal rather than by
certiorari, as I would think it usually would be in these cases?"47
"As to the effect of the denial of certiorari, the decision clearly
indicates that such a denial is not sufficient to protect the litigant's
right to federal jurisdiction for his federal question. This view
seems quite sound, being based on the ground that denial of certio-
rari imports no decision or consideration of the merits of a case,"
and it certainly is in accord with England.4 As to appeals, they too
may be insufficient to protect the plaintiff's right to a federal court
decision, since they are often dismissed for want of a substantial fed-
eral question or disposed of by summary affirmance."' °
"But is not the dismissal of an appeal, unlike the denial of cer-
tiorari, a formal adjudication?"
"Yes, but in recent years the Supreme Court has increasingly
narrowed the differences between the two procedures, even to the
point of apparently introducing discretionary factors into the grant
or denial of review." And given the fact that the Court has only a
small amount of time to consider each appeal, "2 it would simply be
unrealistic to hold that without full argument the litigant's federal
47See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964). In the usual abstention case where review is
sought in the Supreme Court, a state court will have upheld the constitutionality of a
state statute. Such cases are unlike the Tribune decisions, in which a court rule was be-
ing challenged as unconstitutional.
48See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
49 See note 29 supra.
50 See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
572-74 (1953).
51 Id. at 574-76.
5 2 See Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958
Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 88-89 (1959).
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claims are barred. Again, this would be in accord with England.53
Of course, if the litigant does fully argue his appeal and the Court
rejects his constitutional claims, he would not be allowed to reliti-
gate them in the lower federal court This was the situation as to
some of the litigant's constitutional claims in Lassiter v. Northamp-
ton County Bd. of Elections."54
"Lassiter?"
"Yes, that is our next case in considering the res judicata prob-
lem. In Lassiter v. Taylor,55 the federal court abstained. The plain-
tiff, feeling compelled to do so by Government & Civic Employees
Organizing Comm, v. Windsor," then presented her federal as well
as her state claims to the state courts, which ruled against her on all
issues. She then appealed to the Supreme Court. The defendants
moved to dismiss on the ground that there was no final judgment
so as to permit Supreme Court appeal "7 because the lower federal
court still retained jurisdiction and that therefore the state court's
answer to the federal constitutional question constituted mere dic-
tum. The Court rejected this argument, overruled the motion, and
affirmed the state supreme court on the merits without referring to
the jurisdictional question. But - and this is the rub! - the Court
said that since the plaintiff had only attacked the state statute in the
state court as unconstitutional on its face, she could still argue that
the statute was discriminatorily applied in 'the federal proceedings
which await the termination of this state court litigation.' Ss Thus
Lassiter would seem to sanction an exception to the res judicata prin-
ciple against splitting causes of action."
"That is somewhat astounding! Do you really think that Lassiter
would be valid today in light of England's voluntary litigation rule
and the Court's decision in NAACP v. Button?"5
53 See note 29 supra.
54360 U.S. 45 (1959).
5152 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.N.C. 1957).
56353 U.S. 364 (1957). The Court held that the litigant must present his state
issues to the state court in light of his federal constitutional claims, in order that the
state court can make its decision with the knowledge that constitutional issues are in-
volved.
57 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964).
58 lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
rl371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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"I cannot answer that directly. Button was based on the finding
that the plaintiffs had completely and fully litigated their federal
questions in the state courts,6" and England requires voluntary full
litigation of the federal claims in the state courts in order to find a
waiver of the right to federal jurisdiction. But England established
no criteria for full litigation. I do think it somewhat anomalous to
allow the plaintiff to have the state court pass on some of his federal
issues and not others. The litigant should be made to choose be-
tween the federal and state court, and to this extent it is impossible
for me to approve of Lassiter. Nevertheless, the decision does have
some points in its favor: it may present a way of handling the diffi-
cult problem of abstention in civil rights cases, which we shall dis-
cuss later.61 The result of the decision is that the state court answers
only the abstract legal question, and it is left for the federal court to
decide the complex issues of discrimination on which freedom from
prejudice, however slight, is essential. Thus the risk of biased fact-
finding and record distortion is obviated, while unnecessary" federal
interference in state concerns is minimized. Then, by pursuing the
direct route to the Supreme Court, available via immediate review
of an adverse state court holding on the federal claim,6" a decision on
the issue involved can be reached much sooner than if the plaintiff
were forced to return to the district court for its findings before ap-
peal. Also, the state court will be able to construe its statute in a
perceived constitutional context, and the danger of federal invalida-
tion of a state statute which, if submitted to a state court, might be
saved through limited construction, is avoided.64 Thus would be
achieved both the most effective disposition of the plaintiff's case, a
maximum of protection, and a greater certainty that decisions will
be rendered by appropriate tribunals."
"But Windsor itself required presentation of all constitutional
issues to the state courts."
60 Id. at 427-28.
61 See text accompanying notes 162-70 infra.
62 Of course, the scope of the term "necessary" in the use of abstention is the sub-
ject of much dispute in civil rights cases. However, if the plaintiff is protected under
the state procedures from unwarranted delay, expense, and risk of unfair treatment,
action on the part of the lower federal court would not seem to be required.
6 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964).
64 The Court ordered abstention a second time in Windsor because the state court
had not interpreted the statute in light of the specific federal constitutional objections
raised against it in the district court.
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"That is true, but only so as to permit the decision of the state
law question to be made in light of the constitutional question. As
long as the federal court is to make the fact-findings on which will
depend the finding of discrimination, and in light of the fact that
discriminatory application of the statute has little to do with the con-
stitutional validity of the statute on its face, presentation of the lat-
ter question would seem to be sufficient to meet the Windsor re-
quirements."
"Well, that may be a valid point, but if Lassiter can or will be
used in the way you have suggested, not only does it allow the liti-
gant to split his cause of action but also it imposes quite a hardship
on him: there is an obvious difficulty in maintaining the distinction
between issues going to the validity of a statute on its face and
those going to its discriminatory application; the litigant will suffer
the risk of an erroneous interpretation of such a vague distinction,
with the chance of losing the federal jurisdiction resting on that in-
terpretation. In light of England's emphasis on the litigant's right
to federal jurisdiction for his federal claims and the necessity of vol-
untary waiver of this right in order to lose it, does it not seem that
your distinction cannot be maintained?"
"That is a good point, and the opinion in Lassiter did not deal
with the problems we are discussing. The decision did not require
the party to litigate the face validity of the statute in the state court,
nor did it imply that the state court could not have decided the
issue of discriminatory application; the Court simply observed that
the plaintiff had not raised the latter issue before the state courts.
The opinion is hard to reconcile with the language of either Wind-
sor or England, and it is just impossible to say anything definite
regarding its present status as far as the res judicata issue is con-
cerned. However, given the fact that the suggested distinction
which Lassiter presents as to a solution to the problem of abstention
in civil rights cases has not been followed, as we shall see later,"5
my personal feeling is that there is not much else to recommend it,
and the plaintiff should have to choose between the federal and state
courts as to all his federal questions. If the plaintiff chooses the
state court, he should have to litigate all his federal claims there, and
the England requirement of full litigation should be met whether he
does so or not. Once he has made his choice of the state court, he
0 5 See text accompanying notes 162-70 infra.
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should be required to abide by it all the way and not have another
chance after losing on his first choice."
"I am glad we agree on that. Now, to get back to our main
point, what is your final proposition as to res judicata? Do you
think England commands violation of res judicata principles, and,
if so, how can you justify judicially writing section 1738 of the
United States Code, volume twenty-eight, off the books?"
"As to section 1738, the state rules dictating the effect to be
given a state court judgment by another court of that state, which
section 1738 requires the federal courts to follow, surely do not con-
template an abstention context. Furthermore, because section 1738
is in essence no more than a statutory embodiment of res judicata
principles,66 if we find these principles to be inapplicable in the ab-
stention situation, there is no reason to believe section 1738 should
be any more applicable than those principles it embodies. It is not
very realistic to call non-application of a statutory provision to situa-
tions in which it is not applicable 'judicially writing' the statute off
the books! So let's see if all the res judicata principles are really ap-
plicable in abstention situations.
"Given England's recognition of the litigant's right to federal
court determination of his properly presented federal questions, it is
obviously necessary, in order to preserve this right, to prevent appli-
cation of res judicata to a state court determination of these issues
over the objection of the parties and with the knowledge of the
abstention circumstances. Thus I presume your objection is not to
the need for the non-application of res judicata, given England, but
to the appearance of being so radical in departing this way from
usual judicial principles."
"If you presume that, as you so glibly seem to, then you are pre-
suming the answer to the problem! Our problem, at least mine, is
the non-application of res judicata in the first place. If it is so neces-
sary to do away with it, perhaps there is something wrong with ab-
stention, and we should do away with that instead."
"England guarantees the litigant the right to have the federal
court pass on his federal question. If the state court answers this
question over the litigant's objection, you will agree, will you not,
66 See note 38 supra.
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that the federal court mast be allowed to reexamine the federal ques-
tion to preserve the England right and that in this way res judicata
cannot apply to the state court's determination of the federal ques-
tion?"
"Yes."
"That is all I am presuming. Let us leave to one side for now
any discussion of the value of abstention and the costs to litigate in
terms of delay and so forth. We shall discuss that shortly. 7  Ab-
stention is with us, and seemingly to stay, for it is unlikely that the
Court will overrule all the abstention cases. For now, let us simply
accept abstention and concern ourselves with its demand, which is
made clear in England, that res judicata not be applied to federal
questions answered in the state courts over the parties' objections."
"ine. Then proceed to explain why the non-application of res
judicata in abstention situations is not as radical as it seems to me."
"First, that aspect of res judicata requiring the raising of all issues
to prevent splitting the cause of action is not at all applicable to ab-
stention situations.68 The action is already split into a federal ques-
tion and a state question; and where the parties do not raise the fed-
eral issues in the state courts - either because of an injunction or
simply because they know that to do so would constitute a waiver of
the right to federal court determination of these issues - they can-
not be said to ever have had the opportunity to raise such issues in
the state courts. As a matter of practical reality, under such circum-
stances, the parties do not have that opportunity."
"I will agree that it does not seem realistic to say that a party has
an opportunity to raise an issue when he knows that to do so will
force him to forgo a right he has otherwise been guaranteed. I will
therefore agree that res judicata principles should be modified to the
extent necessary to allow a party not to raise all issues in the state
67 See text accompanying notes 141.43, 153-62, 174-78 infra.
68 This is true in reference to consideration of the abstention situation as consti-
tuting, in a sense, two causes of action: one involving the state law issue, the other in-
volving the federal law issue. It is not true that more than one cause of action may
arise out of the federal issue or the state issue, and it is not meant to imply approval
of allowing a litigant to raise only a part of his federal question in the state court. See
the discussion of the Lassiter litigation accompanying notes 54-65 supra.
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court without losing the right to raise them (that is, the federal is-
sues) later in the federal court. But does this sanction relitigation
of an issue already litigated, even if it had been done over the party's
objections? Once the party has fairly litigated his issue, it seems
to me he should not be allowed to litigate it again."
"Now you are doing the presuming. The whole point is
summed up in your word 'fairly.' England determined that because
the litigant has a right to have the federal issues determined in the
federal court, he cannot have them fairly determined in the state
court over his objection."
"But why can he not have the federal issues fairly determined in
the state court?"
"Now you are asking me why we need federal question jurisdic-
tion at all, which is just a little beyond the scope of our discussion
and also completely beside the point here. Regardless of why fed-
eral question jurisdiction exists, England simply holds that once it is
properly invoked the litigant cannot be deprived of his right to it.
Irrespective of the fairness possible in the state court in any abstract
sense, it would not be 'fair' - if you will - to deprive the litigant
of his right. No matter what may be said for the quality of a state
court judgment on the issue, the litigant has made the decision that
only a federal court determination will be satisfactory to him, and
he cannot be deprived of the right to make this choice."
"Yes, but other important rights are subject to being lost
through application of res judicata. For example, in Fauntleroy v.
Lum,69 the res judicata principle against relitigation was held to out-
weigh the litigant's right to have Mississippi law applied. What
makes this England right so different?"
"The situation in cases like Lum differs substantially from ab-
stention cases and thus calls for different considerations. In a case
69210 U.S. 230 (1908). In this case an appeal was taken from a Mississippi
Supreme Court decision denying full faith and credit to a Missouri judgment on a
"futures" contract between two Mississippi citizens on the basis that the Missouri court
had misconstrued the Mississippi law, which was conceded to govern the case. The
Court held that since the judgment was res judicata in Missouri, the defendant having
failed to directly attack the judgment by appeal to the Supreme Court, the judgment
could not be collaterally attacked and was due full faith and credit in Mississippi even
though it was found that the Missouri court had misconstrued the Mississippi law.
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like Lam, the litigant is held to have voluntarily waived his right be-
cause of his failure to take the necessary steps available to him to
protect his right by appealing to the Supreme Court to have the
error corrected.7" In abstention cases, as we are considering them
here, the litigant has not voluntarily waived his right."
"But could not the litigant in an abstention case appeal to the
Supreme Court and if he failed to do so be held to have thereby
waived his right to federal determination of the federal question?"
"Yes, the litigant in the abstention case could appeal to the Su-
preme Court, but there is this basic distinction between the two situa-
tions. In situations similar to that in Lam, the appeal will be on
the merits, and if the Supreme Court reverses, that is the end of the
case; there is no need for further decision by any lower courts.71 In
abstention cases, however, the appeal would not be on the merits
but instead would be an attack on the power of the state court to an-
swer the federal question (which, of course, England holds the state
court does not have if the litigant properly reserves that question72).
If the Court reverses here - as it is bound to do because of Eng-
land - nothing is settled, for the case must be returned to the
district court for decision of the federal question. But the district
court itself can hold that the state had no power to answer the fed-
eral question, so the appeal to the Supreme Court solves nothing
and is a great waste of time. Further, this extra delay might very
well be enough to frighten litigants away from returning to the dis-
trict court. Thus, in Lam situations, there is no 'cost' in requiring
appeal, while in abstention situations the cost of requiring appeal
would be rather severe in terms of the delay it would cause with no
corresponding benefit. In the former situations, then, it is held that
there being no cost in taking the appeal, the litigant loses his right
if he voluntarily fails to take it in order to preserve that right. In
the latter situations, on the other hand, it is held that the cost of re-
quiring appeal is too high, in light of the fact that it accomplishes
nothing, to justify finding that failure to take it is a voluntary
waiver of the litigant's right."
"All right, I apologize for diverting you. I see your point."
70 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964).
71 The only further action necessary would be a remand to the state court to enter
judgment "not inconsistent with the Court's opinion."
72 See notes 27, 29 supra and accompanying text.
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"That is perfectly all right, your questions were good ones."
"Thank you. Go on with what you were saying."
"Well, once you have admitted that res judicata principles are to
be modified to the extent of not barring the litigant from presenting
the federal issues in the federal court after having failed to raise
them in the state court any further than was necessary to fulfill the
Windsor73 requirements, then the further modification of those prin-
ciples so as not to bar relitigation of the federal issues in the federal
court after their state court determination over the parties' reserva-
tions follows quite naturally. The basis we found for not applying
the rules of bar and merger was the litigant's right to the federal
court determination. If this right is to mean anything, it must be
protected, for, as the old saying goes, 'a right without a remedy is no
right at all.'74 The remedy given is simply the non-application of
res judicata if the state court attempts to infringe upon the right."
"Your logic is fine, but the conclusion still seems radical."
"It really is not so radical. Much the same solution has been de-
veloped in the area of federal habeas corpus to ensure federal court
determination of federal rights,75 and the policy of res judicata -
that there be an end to litigation - is not an inflexible rule; it may
be varied to accommodate other policies." In the abstention situa-
tion we have the policies of avoidance of constitutional questions
and of deference to the right of a state to declare what its law is to
be, and it is these policies which the use of res judicata in this situa-
tion would operate to defeat; for if res judicata did apply and absten-
tion could thus result in defeating a litigant's right to federal juris-
diction, it is likely that the use of abstention itself could no longer be
73 Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S.
364 (1957).
74 This quotation is derived from a statement by Coke: 'Want of right and want
of remedy are in one equipage." 6 Rep. 58b. The first reported use of it in a case
was by Holt, C.J.: "lI)t is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy . . .
[because] want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal." Ashby v. White, 2
Raym. 938, 953 (1703). The first American judge to make use of it was Mr. Justice
Johnson in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 684, 693 (1813):
"To assert that he has a right, and yet that he has no remedy, appears to me rather
paradoxical."
75See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
76 See Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See also Developments
in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. RnV. 818 (1952).
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justified. The result of England's holding insofar as it necessitates
modification of res judicata principles is no more than an accommo-
dation of the basic abstention policies and those of res judicata so as
to prevent abstention from expanding beyond its justifying rationale
to the point of denying the litigant his statutory right to a federal
adjudication of his federal issues and thus jeopardizing the use of
abstention. Furthermore, any comity argument in support of res
judicata disappears in light of the state court's disregard of the
parties' declared rights in the abstention situation."
"But are you not urging a complete destruction of res judicata
rather than a mere variance or modification of its principles?"
"Not at all. First, there never seems to have been any indication
that res judicata would not apply to the state court determination of
the state issues."77
"What about the indication by Judge Rives in Leiter Minerals,
Inc. v. United States78 that the federal court is not necessarily bound
to follow the state court's decision on the state law?"
"I do not think Judge Rives meant to imply that the court could
refuse to accept the state supreme court's interpretation of the state
law. If he did, I must respectfully suggest that he is in error. Cer-
tainly Erie R.R. v. Tompkins7" commands a federal court to accept a
state supreme court's interpretation of state law, and, for reasons we
shall see later, the state court's answer to the state law question in an
abstention situation is in essence no different from its answer to any
other state law question in any case it decides, for in both circum-
stances the state court decision will be given stare decisis effect
within the state."8
"But does not the federal court have to be able to refuse to fol-
low the state decision in abstention situations in order to ensure that
the state court does not exert bias against the litigant by distorting
its law?"
77 
"[The state court determination] settles the question so far as concerns .. .state
law." Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1958);
"T]he state courts . . . can decide definitively . . . questions of state law ... 
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1957).
78 329 F.2d 85, 91 (5th Cir. 1964).
79 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
80 See text accompanying notes 183-85 in!ra.
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"No, because the fear of distortion is too remote in these situa-
tions and is thus an insufficient reason to allow the federal court to
deny res judicata effect to the state court's decision. In a case based
solely on a federal question, if the state court distorts its law, the
plaintiff will nonetheless prevail, so the distortion would serve no
purpose.81 In a diversity case, the chance that the state court will
distort its law is quite remote. Use of abstention presupposes uncer-
tain state law; therefore the state court will be formulating the
state's law for the first time. Since this is likely to be stare decisis on
the question, and since the law is designed primarily for the benefit
of the citizens of that state who will rely on the decision, it surely is
improbable that the state will distort its law, thus doing injury to its
own citizens who will rely on it, just to prejudice an out-of-state liti-
gant in the particular case. Of course the decision can be reversed
later, but this is not so easily done and does not contribute much to
stability in the law. In addition, it may take some time before it is
reversed, and, in the meantime, citizens of the state will have relied
on the first interpretation. Thus, because the factors which might
induce a state court to distort the law for a particular case are heav-
ily outweighed by the reasons for not doing so, it is unrealistic to ex-
pect any deliberate distortion. The remote possibility of such an
occurrence is an insufficient reason to allow the federal court to deny
res judicata effect to state decisions in diversity cases involving ab-
stention. Moreover, the integrity of state supreme court justices,
perhaps more than any other single factor, is sufficient to keep the
state courts from distorting their law simply to prejudice an out-
of-state litigant."
"That sounds reasonable. Are there any further examples of
res judicata being applied?"
"Certainly. Full res judicata effect is also given state court de-
termination of federal issues when the litigant voluntarily and fully
litigates those issues there. Mr. Justice Brennan makes this clear in
81 For example, suppose the plaintiff is challenging an agency order as unauthorized
by the state statute and, if authorized, as unconstitutional. If the order is authorized
by the state statute, and the state court so holds, the case returns to the federal court for
determination of the federal constitutional question. If the state court distorts its law
by so holding, the case still returns to the federal court. On the other hand, if
the state court holds the order to be unauthorized by the state statute, the case is over and
the plaintiff wins.
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England.82 And, finally, we have already noted that the litigant
should not be allowed to divide his federal claim.
' 83
"I am reluctant to concede so easily, but you have made your
point."
"Actually, the problem is probably more academic than practi-
cal. I am confident, along with Mr. Justice Brennan, that 'state
courts, sharing the abstention doctrine's purpose of "furthering the
harmonious relation between state and federal authority," [citing
Pullman84] ...will respect a litigant's reservation of his federal
claims for decision by the federal courts.'85 One state supreme court
has even reversed the lower state court for deciding both the state
and federal constitutional issues, reasoning that 'the function we are
to perform is limited in its scope. The case brought in the District
Court, with its basic issues concerning the constitutionality of the
tax as applied to the plaintiff, is still pending there; and it is not for
us to trench upon its right to decide those issues.'86 Another state su-
preme court, after admitting that it was not following precedent,
exercised jurisdiction, although a justiciable controversy did not exist
under prior state law standards, 'out of respect for, and as a courtesy
to, that court.., in the hope that our opinion will be of some assis-
tance to the United States Supreme Court in its solution of the fun-
damental question raised in the litigation pending in the federal
courts.
87
"Although it may not be justifiable to overrule precedent simply
because the Supreme Court asks a favor of a state88 and, admittedly,
no other case outside of Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin89
has been found in which a state court has refused to adjudicate fed-
82 375 U.S. 411,417-19 (1964).
83 See text accompanying note 65 supra.
84 Railroad Commn' v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
85 375 U.S. at 421 n.12.
86 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 40-41, 61 A.2d 89, 92 (1948),
reversing 15 Conn. Supp. 205 (Super. Ct. 1947). The superior court rendered its
opinion pursuant to the Court's instructions on remand in Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
87 Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 927-28, 132 So. 2d 845, 850
(1961). This case was a sequel to Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220
(1957).
88 See Note, 40 TExAs L. REv. 1041, 1045 (1962). But precedent holding such
cases to present non-justicable issues may be overruled on better grounds. See text
accompanying notes 181-85 infra.
89323 U.S. 101 (1944).
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eral constitutional issues because a federal court had retained juris-
diction, these cases represent the reciprocal attitude of comity on the
part of the federal court in abstaining and the state court in accepting
the limitations of its role following abstention. Surely it is not
unlikely that similar considerations will lead to similar attitudes else-
where. Even in a case where the state supreme court felt that its
law forbade it to answer the state question alone, finding that under
its law to do so would constitute a forbidden advisory opinion, it
was moved to remark that 'we can readily understand the desirability
of a decision of the Supreme Court of a State, on the part of the
Circuit Court [ the Fifth Circuit], where it is required to follow the
law of the State deciding such questions as we have here . .. ."'
"Abstention, in light of the England rule, makes good sense:
federal courts are authoritative as to federal questions and state
courts are authoritative as to state questions - let both remain in
their own province. As long as the courts find, as we have, that
these policies are of considerable value and that res judicata policies
can be reasonably modified so as to accommodate them, there is no
reason to expect that the England commands will not be respected."
"In light of your explanation, I am convinced that the departure
from res judicata principles is not so radical after all."
"Good. Do you also see how our discussion disposes of any con-
tention that abstention in federal question cases is an abrogation of
federal question jurisdiction?"
"I am not sure. I can see that the federal court will answer the
federal questions, but does federal question jurisdiction not give the
litigant a right to federal determination of the facts too?"
"It certainly does, and Mr. Justice Brennan so stated in Eng-
land." Under England, the only thing a state court decides is the
state questions."
"Oh, I see - the state court will merely issue an advisory opin-
ion to the federal court. What about the Texas Supreme Court in
90 United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 386 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. Civ. App.),
aff'd, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
91 "[I]n cases where, but for the application of the abstention doctrine, the primary
fact determination would have been by the District Court, a litigant may not be un-
willingly deprived of that determination." 375 U.S. at 417.
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United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney92 and all the other state courts
which are likely to agree?"
"There is an answer to the 'advisory opinion' problem, but again
I ask your indulgence for a short time. 3 For now, assume the fed-
eral court performs the fact-finding function. Assuming this to be
so, can you then see how our discussion of the res judicata problem
answers the contention that abstaining in federal question jurisdic-
tion cases amounts to abnegation of the statutory right9 4 to such
jurisdiction?"
"Certainly, as long as we make that assumption. The federal
court having determined the facts, if the litigant is guaranteed the
right to return to the federal court, that court will answer his federal
question. However, if the state court's answer to the state question
does away with the federal question, then there is no further need for
federal jurisdiction; that is to say, if no federal question remains,
then obviously there is no further need for federal question jurisdic-
tion."
"Very good."
III. DivERsITY - Erie AND ABSTENTION
"Not so fast. The way you posed your question leads directly
into an area which I believe presents considerably more difficult
problems. 5 First, can I assume that England can be read as imply-
ing preservation of all federal jurisdiction statutorily guaranteed to
a litigant, so as to include - as well as federal question jurisdiction
cases - those cases in which the only basis for federal jurisdiction
is diversity of citizenship?"
"Even though England was a federal question case, I certainly
think your assumption is justifiable in light of the language used in
the opinion."
92386 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. Civ. App.), affd, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
See text accompanying note 90 supra.
93 See text accompanying notes 181-85 infra.
9 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
05 For an excellent artide concerning the problems discussed herein and on which
much of the discussion is based, see Note, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits:
"Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YAE LEJ. 850 (1964).
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"Fine. And yet subsequent to abstention in a diversity case, no
matter what the state court decision on the state law is, there is
nothing to come back to the federal court; and for the federal court
to find just the facts in such a situation would be an advisory opin-
ion, since the state law question - and thus the state court - will
decide the case. Therefore, does not the contention that abstention
in diversity cases destroys federal diversity jurisdiction seem a valid
one?"
"It certainly does, and this leads us into one of the most basic
problems with the use of the abstention doctrine: the conflict it pre-
sents and represents in federal jurisdictional doctrines. We have
been assuming that the policies behind abstention are good ones,
and this is not the place to question these policies. But your ques-
tion raises the basic issue of whether it is possible - and if so, how
-to reconcile those policies with other policies considered to be of
equal importance and validity."
"Do you mean we will do the same thing here as we did with
the res judicata problem: balance the policies and see if they can be
accommodated?"
"That is correct, but our problem here is more difficult because
the policies are even more basic, going to the root of our federal
system."
"Our purpose then, should be not to judge abstention in the ab-
stract but rather, taking its policies as valid ones, to see if the price
we pay for them may weigh too heavily in terms of the sacrifice of
other policies. In short, should we not determine whether Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas was correct in stating that abstention may be 'an un-
necessary price to pay for our federalism'?"96
"Precisely."
"I can see the problem generally as abstention in diversity cases
definitely being an abnegation of diversity jurisdiction, but the exact
scope of the problem and just why it goes to the root of our federal-
ism is still a little hazy. Would you mind expressing it more specifi-
cally for me?"
9 6 Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Eogland, 375 U.S. at 426.
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"Not at all, and I believe that to do so will enable us to focus on
some of the particular facets of the problems of abstention.
"The basic problem stems from the conflict between federal di-
versity jurisdiction and the doctrine which has been said to serve as
a cornerstone for the foundation of our federalism:97 that set forth in
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.8  The doctrine of Erie may be seen as a
strong generating force of the abstention doctrine itself,99 and, in
turn, abstention, while reinforcing the Erie principle, heightens the
conflict between that principle and the principle of federal diversity
jurisdiction.
"Although we do not wish to get into a detailed discussion of
Erie, in basic terms the conflict is simply between the scope of the
federal judicial function in diversity cases as interpreted before Erie
and the degree to which the premises of Erie limit that scope. Erie
made it clear that a federal court with diversity jurisdiction was to
decide the state law questions on which the case turned by applying
the rules and principles established in the state courts and not by
fashioning 'federal general common law.'1 " The federal courts'
jurisdiction in diversity cases, resting on the theory that they were
simply alternative forums provided to ensure the potential 'foreign'
litigant against possibly biased fact-finding and uneven application
of state law, did not exist for the purpose of defining that law."' 0 '
"Are you saying then that the conflict basically arises from the
fact that under Erie the federal courts' functions were curtailed and




"Fine. Now please explain how abstention relates to Erie so as
to heighten this conflict?"
97 See generally Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution (pts. 1-2), 53 Nw.
U.L. REv. 427, 541 (1958).
98304 U.S. 64 (1938).
99 Cf. Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. REV. 629, 645 (1951).
100 304 U.S. at 78.
101 "Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent appre-
hended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the State." Id. at 74.
See also Note, 59 COLuM. L. REv. 504 (1959) and cases cited therein.
102 Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946) and Corbin, The Laws of the Sevaeral States,
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"Well, the federal court is required by Erie to apply the state law
as declared by the state courts, preferably the state supreme court, as
this will be the most authoritative declaration of the meaning of the
state law."°3 But the federal court may be unable to do this either
because the state law has not yet received an authoritative interpreta-
tion or because the state law is unsettled, uncertain, or difficult.'
When one or both of these unfortunate circumstances develop, Erie
would require the federal court to apply what it thinks the state
courts will decide the state law to be and not what the federal court
thinks the state law should be, thus requiring a prediction as to what
the ultimate determination by the state supreme court will be on the
particular question. Abstention enables the federal court to avoid
this forecasting and makes possible an authoritative resolution of
the state law question."
"But since the lower state court will normally get the case fol-
lowing abstention, it too will have to make a prediction as to the
meaning of the state law. Could not the federal judge, who will un-
doubtedly be a member of the bar of the state in which he sits, make
as good a forecast of the state law as could the state judge?"
"Even assuming the district judge is a member of the state bar
and granting he could do as good a job of forecasting, the federal
judge's forecast is unreviewable in the state courts; this eliminates
the possibility of an authoritative resolution. By allowing the state
judge to do the forecasting, an authoritative resolution can be
achieved by review of that forecast in the state supreme court."
"I see. Abstention thereby enhances the Erie principle of hav-
ing federal diversity courts apply state law. Nevertheless, how does
this heighten the conflict between diversity jurisdiction and the Erie
principle?"
"The conflict is intensified because the use of abstention in diver-
sity cases drives the Erie rule almost to the limit of its logic. If Erie
demands that a federal court in a diversity suit reach the same result
50 YALE L.J. 762 (1941), both criticize Erie for depriving federal judges of their
"traditional" law-dedaring functions.
103 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941).
104 For a discussion of the meaning of these terms, see Note, Abstention: An Exercise
in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 226, 228 n.19 (1959). For a discussion of the prob-
lem of a federal court finding state law in diversity suits, see generally Note, supra note
101.
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that would be reached if the case were decided in a state court,"5
abstention is practically the only way this result can be assured
where state law is uncertain. However, if the diversity court ab-
stains where the decision on the state law is dispositive of the case,
then diversity jurisdiction is destroyed."
"May I interrupt? Allow me to quote from Meredith v. Winter
Haven,0 6 where the Court held that Erie did not justify abstention:
'[Difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter de-
termine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient
ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdic-
tion .... 0  How do you reconcile Meredith with your assertion
that Erie demands abstention in cases where state law is uncertain?"
"Please recall that a more recent diversity case, Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. Thibodaux..8 sanctioned abstention where there was
no constitutional question and only a doubtful state law question."
"But I thought we decided that the consensus was that Thibo-
daux did not overrule Meredith?"'0 9
"That is true, but the Fifth Circuit, as well as other federal
courts,"0. have read Thibodaux as authorizing abstention in diversity
cases where the only problem is a doubtful state law question, and
there are some writers who agree with this."' Furthermore, the
Fifth Circuit's decisions to abstain in Green v. American Tobacco
Co."2 and in Delaney"3 can be easily understood in terms of Erie.
105 This so-oled "outcome-determinative" test was announced in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), which held that Erie required that a federal court
should not reach a substantially different result than would a state court ff the action
had been brought there.
106 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
107 Id. at 234.
108 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
'
0 9 See note 2 supra. See also Gowen & Izlar, Federal Court Abstention in Diversity
of Citizenship Litigation, 43 ToXAS L REV. 194, 203-05 (1964); Wright, The Absten-
tion Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 815, 823 (1959); Note, Judicial Absten-
tion From the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COLUM L. REV. 749, 764-65 (1959);
Note, Abstention: A? Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L REV. 226, 247-50 (1959).
110 See note 2 supra.
'
1 1 See Note, Federal Abstention and Its Relation to the Erie Doctrine, 38 TEmp.
LQ. 72, 78 (1964).
112 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cit. 1962), rWv'd on rehearing, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
This was a diversity action brought by a Florida resident in the Florida district court
seeking damages for wrongful death allegedly due to lung cancer caused by the de-
fendant's cigarettes. There being no Florida decision, the circuit court itself first at-
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Once abstention was introduced in Pullman, the idea that the tech-
nique might very well be justified where the only real problem was
a doubtful state law question coincides rather well with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's emphasis in that initial case on the problems of fore-
casting and the evils thereby engendered." 4  This strong emphasis
on the forecasting problem, in turn, fits rather well with the view
that Erie demands something of an identity of outcome, whether the
suit be brought in the federal or state court. Judge Brown, concur-
ring in Delaney, clearly saw an intimate relation between abstention
and Erie; and the frustration, futility, and weariness which the Fifth
Circuit must have felt (and with which one can easily sympathize)
in having their forecasts of state law consistently rejected by the
state courts"5 can be seen as a strong basis for his position."''
tempted to answer the controlling state law question of whether absolute liability was
imposed on the cigarette manufacturer for breach of implied warranty. On rehear-
ing, however, the court reversed itself and - even though there was no constitutional
question, no ambiguous state statute, and no state regulation involved - in an unrea-
soned per curiam opinion, ordered certification of the controlling question under
Florida's certification statute, FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1961).
113 United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964). This
was a diversity case brought by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy which turned
on the Texas common law of insurance. Confused about the meaning of state decisions,
a sharply divided court sitting en banc ordered abstention.
1 14 
"[No matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it can-
not escape being a forecast rather than a determination. The last word on the meaning
of [the state law] ... belongs neither to us nor to the district court but to the supreme
court of Texas. In this situation a federal court . . . is asked to decide an issue by
making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication.
... The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is
thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court." Railroad Comm'n v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941).
115 Judge Brown sets forth cases of rejection by the courts of Texas, Alabama, and
Florida: Truck Ins. Exch. v. Seelbach, 161 Tex. 250, 339 S.W.2d 521 (1960), rejecting
National Sur. Corp. v. Bellah, 245 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1957); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rejecting New York Times Co. v. Con-
nor, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So. 2d 730
(Fla. 1961), rejecting Pogue v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th
Cir. 1957). See also United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486 (5th
Cir. 1964).
116 This concern [the impact of the federal system on local litigants and juris-
prudence] is, for example, reflected by the "outcome determinative" test like-
wise [as abstention) judge-fashioned to meet the needs of Erie, only few of
which had emerged when Meredith . . .was announced in 1943. This ap-
proach recognizes that it is basically unfair for decision [sic] to turn on irrele-
vant accidents such as state citizenship, residence, geography, or the case being
filed in one courthouse, rather than in the one a block down the street.
If in like cases diverse results are unfair when precipitated by quasi-
procedural rules ...how much more unfair is it when the diverse result
flows from diverse holdings on substantive law. This is a factor of growing
importance as our own recent experience graphically demonstrates. Though our
decisions survive the discretionary review of certiorari, most of the time be-
cause they are really not "certworthy," .... many of them do not fare so well
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"But given the Court's decisions in cases akin to Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.,". is it necessary or even justifiable to read
Erie so broadly as to demand an identity of result?"
"Possibly not, but it is difficult to tell. Without getting into an
involved discussion of Erie at this time,"' let me just point out that
some feel that the doctrine should be interpreted narrowly so as to
apply only to prevent a federal court from.simply ignoring existing
state decisional law" 9 and that it should not extend to cases where
no state law exists at all."1 On the other hand, there are those who
agree with Judge Brown that Erie should be broadly construed so as
to compel an identity of result.'" The former view was sup-
ported by the Court in 1949 when it said, referring to Erie, that it 'is
itself a precedent against any general ruling that cases properly in
the federal courts that depend upon state law should have that issue
submitted to state courts for decision." 22 Whether the Court would
say the same today is difficult to determine, given the decisions in
Byrd and the other similar cases you have mentioned.2 Un-
doubtedly, the exact position lies somewhere between the two ex-
tremes; yet it has been said that the line is closer to the broader
view,1" and the Court's extension of the abstention doctrine in cases
like Thibodaux supports this position."
"Well, if we assume that Erie does compel an identity of result,
then abstention is definitely a desirable end where state law is un-
clear, is it not?"
when they are tested in the place that really counts - the highest... court,
of the State concerned. Id. at 486 (concurring opinion). (Footnote omitted.)
117356 U.S. 525 (1958). See cases cited in Note, supra note 111, at 74 n.1.
118 For an excellent discourse on the meaning of Erie, see Kurland, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE
LJ. 187 (1957).
119 See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
120 See HART & WEcHsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
619 (1953). See also Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L
REv. 407, 411 (1956).
1 2 1 See note 116 supra. See also Clark, Fedeal Procedural Reform and States'
Rights; to a More Perfect Union, 40 TEXAS L REV. 211, 220 (1961); Smith, Blue
Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL.
L REv. 443, 466 (1962).
122 Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490-91 (1949).
123 See cases cited in Note, supra note 111, at 74 n.1l.
12 4 See Note, supra note 95, at 857-58, citing Clark, Federal Procedural Reform
and States' Rights; to a More Perfect Union, 40 TEXAS L REy. 211 (1961) and Smith,
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"Not definitely, no. As Erie must bend for other policies - as
in Byrd - and is desirable only as long as its ends can be achieved
in accord with other policies, so too with abstention. It is desirable,
but only to the extent that it 'can be implemented in a manner con-
sonant with other policies."125 In short, abstention is desirable only
so long as its achievements outweigh the harms it creates in terms
of hindrance to other policies. Thus, even though abstention does
provide advantages in furthering desired policies, 12 it is necessary
for us to examine the problems it creates with respect to other de-
sired policies and to see if solutions are available which will alleviate
these problems, at least to the extent that we can feel that the doc-
trine is being implemented consistently with other desired ends."
"Perhaps an example would clarify your reasoning."
"That is a good suggestion. We have already seen the problem
of possible abnegation of federal question jurisdiction by the use of
abstention in such cases, and we have also determined that the poli-
cies behind abstention could be achieved while still preserving the
policies behind federal question jurisdiction. 27 Let us now consider
a diversity case, such as Green or Delaney, and see if under existing
methods - that is, without considering possible solutions - absten-
tion is usable in such cases without destroying the policies behind di-
versity jurisdiction."
"Might we not be faced with a real problem here, given the dis-
agreement on exactly what policies do lie behind diversity jurisdic-
tion 2 and the persistent arguments that today there is no justifiable
rationale for such jurisdiction 29 and that it should therefore be
abolished?"
Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalismr in Diversity Litigation, 36
TUL. L. REV. 443 (1962).
125 Note, supra note 95, at 858.
1 26 I.e., enhancement of Erie and the authoritative determination of state law as well
as the avoidance of constitutional questions. Cf. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941). As throughout this discussion, the values of these ends are accepted
at desirable.
12 7 See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
12 8 On the history and purposes of diversity jurisdiction, see Note, supra note 95,
at 858-59 & nn.39-40, 44-46, including articles cited therein.
129 For arguments against diversity jurisdiction, see Note, supra note 111, at 82
& n.63, including articles cited therein.
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"This is obviously not the place to deal with the overwhelming
issues of the value of diversity jurisdiction. In some form or an-
other, there does seem to be agreement that it exists to prevent one
or more kinds of bias against out-of-state litigants, and the plain fact
is that Congress, obviously feeling the dangers to be real, has pro-
vided for diversity jurisdiction since 1789.18 Further, Congress has
shown with the Three-Judge District Court Act,'' the Johnson
Act of 19 34 ,"'a and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937... that it will
curtail federal jurisdiction in limited areas when it feels that such
action is appropriate. Congress has altered diversity jurisdiction
when it has felt the need to do so"n but has been unwilling to abol-
ish it.' Obviously, such an abolition should come from Congress
and not from the courts,'36 and England's emphasis on preservation
of congressionally granted federal jurisdiction indicates that the
Court agrees. As we are dealing with abstention, we can, for our
purposes here, accept diversity jurisdiction as given and simply see if
the use of abstention in such cases amounts to judicial destruction of
that jurisdiction and its policies."
"Very well, then, is there any way abstention can be used in di-
versity cases while protecting the out-of-state litigant against local
bias?"
"Given the existing system - that is, the way abstention is pres-
ently used, as in Green and Delaney - the answer, I believe, must
1301 Stat 73 (1789). The present statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964),
13128 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1964). See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 120,
at 846-55.
13228 U.S.C. § 1342 (1964). See HART & WEcHSLER, op. cit. supra note 120,
at 855-56.
13 28 U.S.C. 5 1341 (1964). See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 120, at
856-57.
134 Id. at 898-900. In 1958, the jurisdictional amount was raised to ten thousand
dollars, and other restrictions were added. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (1964).
L35 In 1930 Senator Norris introduced S. 4357, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930),
abolishing diversity jurisdiction. The bill, although favorably reported by
the Judiciary Committee, never came up for debate. In 1932 Senator Norria
introduced the same bill as S. 939, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); Represen-
tative La Guardia introduced it in the House as H.1L 11508, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1932). The Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the bill
and again reported it favorably, but it never came to a vote; the House Com-
mittee made no report. Note, sura note 111, at 82 n.64.
136See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,
344-45, 348 (1943).
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be no. It seems impossible to escape the result of the process you
described so well previously."'3 7
"I think it would help if you explained precisely why that is so.
Do you mind?"
"Not at all. The considerations are somewhat different at the
trial level from those at the appellate level, so we should examine
these separately. No depth of analysis is required to see that a dis-
missal at the trial level would deprive the litigant who chose the fed-
eral court38 of any federal protection against bias. The Court's
holding in Meredith, which it has been careful not to question,. 8
bears this out and should remain unimpaired. And retention is
really no better, for in a case like Delaney, it too would seem to
effectively result in a dismissal. As you pointed out, even if the fed-
eral court performed the fact-finding function - where it is possible
to isolate questions of fact from questions of law - this would
merely be an advisory opinion to the state court, forbidden by article
III of the Constitution as interpreted by the Court.40 Further, and
as you also pointed out earlier, the state courts will very likely wish
to do their own fact-finding, and there is seemingly nothing binding
them to follow the federal court's findings of fact. All of this is
likely to frighten litigants away from the federal courts because
they are faced at this early stage with the possibility of two law suits
instead of one.' 4' Thus, the benefits to be derived from abstention
in obtaining an authoritative declaration of state law would not be
justified in terms of the results of its use in depriving the litigant of
his congressionally granted right to be in the federal court, especially
where preservation of this right is most relevant; and given Eng-
137 See text accompanying note 95 supra.
138 Either the plaintiff, invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1964) or the defendent on removal from the state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1964).
13 9 Meredith was cited with approval in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25, 27 (1959). This has been the basis of the argument that Thibodaux does
not overrule Meredith. See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673 n.5 (1963)
(dictum).
140 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
141 As was said in another context:
The King of Brobdingnag gave it for his opinion that, 'whoever could make
two ears of corn, or two blades of grass to grow upon a spot of ground where
only one grew before, would deserve better of mankind, and do more essential
service to his country than the whole race of politicians put together.' In
matters of justice, however, the benefactor is he who makes one lawsuit grow
where two grew before. Chafee, Bills of Peace With Multiple Parties, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1932).
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land's emphasis on the preservation of statutory federal jurisdic-
tional rights, the Court is likely to find the cost of using abstention
here too high."
"I see now why the considerations would be different at the ap-
pellate level. It does not seem that abstention at the appellate level
would deprive a litigant of the benefits of federal jurisdiction, be-
cause he will already have had a full federal trial on the merits. If
the appellate court abstains so as to ascertain what the correct state
law is - in compliance with Erie which requires the federal courts
to follow the state law- - it should not concern the litigant that
this law is interpreted by the state court. So perhaps abstaining at
this stage of litigation would not be as harmful. Is this correct?"
"Unfortunately, no. First, the parties will already have spent a
good deal of time and money in the case, and abstention imposed
here would create a considerable additional burden, making two
suits where only one existed before, which is a result unwanted by at
least one of the parties. Indeed, the imposition of such additional
burdens may be the motive behind the assertion of the doctrine by
the other party.14 Furthermore, the individual litigant is likely to
be unconcerned about disparity in the legal order and, having had
his 'day in court,' would value much more a present decision rather
than a 'more perfect' one sometime in the indefinite future. To him,
abstention - at least in the absence of some more compelling rea-
son than doubtful state law, which he is likely to have known about
when he brought suit - may seem a senseless, and possibly an in-
tolerable, burden."' 43
"Is not this delay problem equally applicable in federal question
cases?"
142Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 42-44 (1959); Har-
rison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
148 Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly afford one
lawsuit, let alone two. Shuttling the parties between state and federal tri-
bunals is a sure way of defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit of justice
is not an academic exercise. There are no foundations to finance the resolu-
tion of nice state law questions involved in federal court litigation. The
parties are entitled - absent unique and rare situations - to adjudication of
their rights in the tribunals which Congress has empowered to act. Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
quoted by Ar. Justice Douglas, concurring in England v. State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 425 (1964).
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"Yes, but at least in those cases there is something substantial to
come back to the federal court. Let us put aside that problem for
the present,'44 however, and finish our discussion of why abstention
is not justified in a diversity case even if limited to the appellate
level."
"Very well. From your point concerning the burden to the liti-
gants in the case, it seems to me that without abstention there may
be an equal burden imposed on others. The federal decision is
likely either to induce people to follow it and order their affairs ac-
cordingly or, at the least, to put in doubt prior arrangements. Legi-
timate private ordering would then certainly be sharply affected
when the state court declared the 'true' state rule to be exactly the
opposite.'45 Also, are not federal judges, who have experienced con-
sistent rejection by the state courts of their forecasts, as probably did
the Fifth Circuit court, 4 ' thereby discouraged from exerting a real
effort to answer difficult state law questions in favor of making
more concentrated efforts elsewhere?"
"Your points are valid, but I think there may be a tendency to
exaggerate the possibilities of disparity. Respective decisions of the
two court systems may not be different, or the variance may be due
more to differences in factual situations than in the interpretation of
the law.'47 And the federal decision may very well give the state
courts some experience with a rule, from which they may be able to
determine its advantages and thus follow the federal court's interpre-
tation or see its disadvantages and thus reach a contrary result"
Furthermore, counsel responsible for private ordering will know the
general requirements of Brie and that the federal decision is not the
ultimate word on the status of the state law. Most importantly,
abstention itself will not guarantee a definitive state ruling, for the
parties may take the case no further than the lowest state court;
and, while the decision is the law of that case, it is dear that under
Erie today such a decision, not necessarily binding on a state court
144 See text accompanying notes 153-62 infra.
145 "No attorney could conscientiously advise a client as to what contract provisions
would be valid," given the uncertain state of the law. A.F.L. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56, 59-60 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
146 See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
14 7 See Johnson v. Luhman, 330 IIl. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947), which fol-
lowed Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945), both of which are noted as
especially interesting cases in Note, 73 YALE L.J. 850, 864 n.72 (1964).
14 8 See id. at 864 n.75.
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in another case, is equally not binding on a federal court in another
case.'49 In fact, in order to solve this dilemma, the Fifth Circuit in
Delaney ordered the parties to carry the declaratory judgment pro-
ceedings to the highest Texas court. 5 ' But at what additional cost
and delay such assurance is purchased! It certainly is highly ques-
tionable to force the litigants, who have brought the suit in order
to have their legal rights settled as quickly as possible, to pay so
heavily in behalf of others with whom they are not concerned for
imperfections and inadequacies in our legal system."
"It is certainly difficult to argue with that. Now I think I do
understand what you were intimating. Under Erie, and in the ab-
sence of abstention, federal judges had to follow state law where it
existed but were still left with the vital role of discerning state law
where there was no clear answer. On the other hand, combining
the use of abstention with Erie and carrying this avoidance of dis-
parity idea to its logical and ultimate conclusion, federal judges
would be left with practically nothing to do: they would have to fol-
low state law not only where it existed but also where it did not.
All they could do would be to assign the question to the state
courts. Thus, for all intents and purposes, diversity jurisdiction
would become meaningless."
"That is exactly correct. As one writer has so well expressed it,
'federal judges would be reduced to little more than sterile monitors
shuttling traffic between a dual system of courts at appropriate
stages of the litigation."""
"Yes, and as judges felt more and more obligated to use absten-
tion, litigants would be more and more discouraged to use the diver-
sity jurisdiction which Congress had granted them. Therefore, the
price we would be paying for the use of abstention here would
amount to the judicial destruction of diversity jurisdiction, which, as
we have seen should not and likely will not 5. be done: in terms of
other policies it is a price too high to be paid for the benefits derived
from the doctrine's use." ,
149See IA MooRE, FEDEmtAL PRACicE 5 0.307[2], at 3305-10 (2d ed. 1965),
discussing this rule derived from King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of
America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948), which conflicted sharply with Fidelity Union Trust Co.
v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
150 United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cit. 1964).
15' Note, supra note 147, at 866.
15 2 See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
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"Precisely so. I would say that you understand this point per-
fectly."
"Thank you. May we return now to the problem of delay in
federal question cases?"
"Certainly."
"Given somewhat spectacular examples such as the decisions in
the Spector Motor Serv., Inc. 5  cases and the decisions in the Leiter
Minerals. cases, it would seem that delay and expense are equally
costly- ff not more so - to the litigants in such cases as in diver-
isty cases. Then why does not this factor of extended delay in fed-
eral question cases outweigh the use of abstention here, as it does in
diversity cases, as an imposition of an unjust burden on the parties?"
"While it is admitted that it may be somewhat of an understate-
ment to say that the 'Brobdingnagian ' ... approach did not work very
well in those cases, the answer to your question is that use of absten-
don in federal question cases provides benefits which are not pro-
vided by its use in diversity cases, namely, avoidance of constitutional
questions.' In addition, we found that use of abstention in diver-
sity cases destroys the policies behind diversity jurisdiction, while its
use in federal question cases does not destroy the policies behind
federal question jurisdiction. In the former, there was nothing left
after abstention to come back to the federal court, while this was
not true of the latter. In short, it was again a matter of balancing,
with the benefits to be derived from abstention outweighing its detri-
153 Decisions in the Spector cases, starting as Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McIaugh-
lin and ending as Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor: 47 F. Supp. 671 (D. Conn.
1942),rev'd, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), vacated, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); 15 Conn. Supp.
205 (Super. C. 1947), remanded, 135 Conn. 37, 61 A.2d 89 (1948); 88 F. Supp. 711
(D. Conn. 1949), rev'd, 181 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1950), revsd, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
154 Decisions in the Leiter Minerals cases, appearing as Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.
United States in the federal courts, and Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California in the state
courts: 127 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. La. 1954), aff'd, 224 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1955),
modified, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); 239 La. 116, 118 So. 2d 124 (1960), transferring to
126 So. 2d 76 (La. Ct. App. 1961), rehearing denied, 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845
(1961); 204 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. La. 1962), revrd, 329 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1964).
155 See note 156 infra and accompanying text.
156 "[The controlling policy, that a federal court will not decide a constitutional
question where decision can go on other grounds, is of sufficient importance to the
whole institution of judicial review that such expense and delay seem justifiable."
Wright, supra note 109, at 818. No opinion of either agreement or disagreement with
this statement is expressed here, since for purposes of this discussion the policies under-
lying absention are assumed to be valid.
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ments to other policies in federal question cases but being out-
weighed by such detriments in diversity cases."
"Then it does not matter how much delay is caused by abstention
in federal question cases?"
"I did not intend to imply that at all. While cases like Spector
demonstrate that the policy of speedy adjudication was not felt to
outweigh the policies behind abstention, 5 ' one of the points that
troubled Mr. Justice Douglas in England about the use of abstention
was the hardship to the litigants caused by the delay engendered by
the use of the doctrine;.5 and the Court has recently shown that it
shares at least in part Mr. Justice Douglas' concern, for in refusing
to order abstention in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp.,159 Griffin v. County School Bd.,' and Baggett v. Bullitt,'6'
the Court placed special emphasis on the fact that the litigants had
suffered in the first two cases or were likely to suffer in the latter
case long delays in securing final adjudication of their rights. Thus
the balance may be shifting, with the Court feeling that the policy
of fast adjudication outweighs the policies behind abstention in some
cases. In other words, the Court may be reaching the point where
it feels that the benefits to be gained from abstention are out-
weighed by the detriment its use causes to the policy of speedy ad-
judication.
15 7 See text accompanying note 156 supra.
158 375 U.S. at 475-76.
159 377 U.S. 324, 328-29 (1964). This was an action in a federal court by a New
York seller of tax-free bottled liquors and wines for export to passengers departing at
New York's airport to enjoin New York State Liquor Authority from interfering
with his business. The Court, stating that the doctrine of abstention should not be
automatically applied even though constitutional issues were involved, held that the
doctrine was unwarranted in this case because neither party requested its application,
litigation had already been long delayed, and disruption of an entire scheme of legis-
lative regulation was not involved.
160 377 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1964). This was a suit by Negro school children to
enjoin the School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia from refusing to operate an
efficient system of free public schools in the county. The Court held that abstention was
properly denied because the issue imperatively called for immediate decision and there
had already been too much delay.
101377 U.S. 360, 375-79 (1964). This was a class action by the faculty, staff,
and students of the University of Washington for a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief against the enforcement of a 1931 Washington statute requiring the taking of an
oath as a condition for employment and a 1951 Washington "loyalty oath" statute. The
Court held that there were no special circumstances in the case justifying abstention,
and the fact that abstention would require piecemeal adjudication - thereby causing
considerable delay - was a factor to be considered in determining whether to apply the
doctrine.
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"However, as we shall see shortly,'6 2 this delay problem can be
solved. This is likely to remove objection to use of abstention in
cases like Hostetter but is not likely to remove objection to its use
in civil rights cases like Griffin and Baggett."
"If the delay problem is removed, what is so special about civil
rights cases?"
"You know that such an attitude towards civil rights today
might well be considered by some as blasphemous!"
"I am willing to assume that risk! If we can solve the delay
problem, what policy factor or factors will remain in such cases to
outweigh the policies behind abstention?"
"Your question is certainly a valid one, so I will assume the
risk with you by attempting to formulate an answer. 6 ' The courts
have for a long time been either reluctant to use abstention or con-
fused about its use in civil rights cases.'" Then, in 1959, when the
Court ordered abstention in Harrison v. NAACP..5 where declara-
tory and injunctive relief was sought before a three-judge district
court on constitutional challenges to five Virginia segregation laws,
it was felt by many that the question had been cleared up in favor
of abstention's use in civil rights cases. 66 However, subsequent
cases may be read to dispel that notion. 7 I do not believe that the
reasons for non-application of abstention to these cases can be stated
any more cogently than Mr. Justice Black stated them in Griffin:
162 See text accompanying notes 174-76, 186-87 infra.
163 For a recent discussion of the problem of abstention in civil rights cases and the
probable direction of the courts, see Note, The Abstention Doctrine: A Problem of
Federalism, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1246 (1964). See also IA MOORE, op. cit. supra note149, 5 0.203M1.
16 See Note, Federal Jurisdiction - Doctrine of Equitable Abstention Applied
to Civil Rights Cases, 20 LA. L. REv. 614, 616-17 & nn.12-15 (1960), including cases
cited therein.
15 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
166 E.g., Note, supra note 164, at 617-18. But cf. id. at 619.
167 See Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Fors-
senius v. Harman, 235 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 379 U.S. 810
(1964), af'd, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Gray v. Johnson, 234 F. Supp. 743 (S.D. Miss.
1964); Embassy Pictures Corp. v. Hudson, 226 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Tenn. 1964);
Note, supra note 163.
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W~e hold that the issues here imperatively call for decision now.
The case has been delayed since 1951 by resistance at the state and
county level, by legislation, and by lawsuits. The original plaintiffs
have doubtless all passed high school age. There has been entirely
too much deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the con-
stitutional rights which we held in Brown v. Board of Education
... had been denied Prince Edward County Negro children. We
accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment remanding the
case to the District Court for abstention, and we proceed to the
merits.'68
"But Griffin does not stand for the proposition that abstention is
inappropriate in civil rights cases, since there had actually been great
delay in the case - a factor stressed by Black, and Hostetter shows
that this delay factor goes beyond civil rights cases. Thus I am not
sure I understand your point."
"Although Griffin can be explained on grounds of delay and
Davis v. Mann 69 on grounds that the state law was not unclear,
Baggett did involve unclear state law, there had been no inordinate
delay involved, and yet the Court reversed the lower court's absten-
tion order and decided the merits of the case.' The point is that
civil rights cases inherently involve areas of much greater sensi-
tivity to the states than do areas of economic regulation. In such
cases involving, for example, school integration (Griffin), loyalty
oaths (Baggett), and legislative reapportionment (Davis), the Court
has felt that the states will exhibit great resistance to change, and
the circumstances of the cases indicate that this is true. Solving the
delay problem in terms of a method to enable a more rapid deter-
mination of the state law question will not overcome the states'
resistance through their ability to protract delay by further legisla-
tion and more law suits. The obvious indication - 'the issues im-
peratively call for decision now' - is that if the constitutional issues
in the civil rights area are to be solved, the federal courts are going to
solve them alone. Especially today, I think no citation of authority
is needed to state that there exists an almost overwhelming policy to
solve these problems as rapidly as possible. Given this policy, it
surely is not surprising that the Court will not let abstention stand in
its way. While it may not be exactly proper to say that such cases
168 377 U.S. at 229. (Emphasis added.)
169 377 U.S. 678, 690 (1964).
170 The three-judge district court decision was rendered on February 9, 1963, 215
F. Supp. 439 (W.D. Wash. 1963), and the Supreme Court case was decided on June 1,
1964, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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as Griffin, Davis, and Baggett assert a rule that abstention is im-
proper in civil rights cases, it seems reasonable to read them as so
indicating. And for the reasons I have stated, it is appropriate that
abstention be denied in this area."
"I think I understand. The benefits to be derived from absten-
tion are outweighed by the policy of rapid solution to the issues in-
herently involved in civil rights cases."
"That is exactly correct. May I commend you again."
"Thank you. There is one more problem I would like to raise
now, if I may, and that is what would happen if jurisdiction were
based on both diversity and a federal question? Would abstention
be appropriate then?"
"In such a situation, there would still be something to come back
to the federal court after the state decision; therefore, abstention
would be as justified here as it would be in a case based on a
federal question alone. As to any fear of state distortion of its own
law, about which Mr. Justice Frankfurter seemed to be concerned in
Burford and Alabama,7' we have previously shown why this is not
really a problem."'1
72
"There seems to be only one general problem with which we
have not yet dealt, and that is the reaction of the state courts to ab-
stention in light of the fact that they will very likely be asked to
issue advisory opinions."
"I believe we can sufficiently cover that problem in the discus-
sion of the solution which I shall tender, and which I have been
putting off, to some of the problems of abstention. Let us proceed
to that now."' 73
171 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336-48 (1943) (dissenting opinion);
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 351-62 (1951) (con-
curring opinion).
172 See text accompanying note 81 supra.
173 For an excellent article on the solution proposed and the problems involved
therein, and on which much of this discussion is based, see Note, Inter-Jurisdictional
Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA.
L. REV. 344 (1963). See also Note, supra note 147, at 866-72.
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IV. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
"Fine. For the sake of clarity, does this mean that you will try
to outline a method to justifiably use abstention in diversity cases
as well as to provide solutions to the delay and advisory opinion
problems?"
"Yes, although I realize it is an ambitious undertaking."
"Indeed it is! I anxiously await your revelations."
"My suggested solution is really rather simple: there should be
a more widespread use of inter-jurisdictional certification, as pro-
vided for in Florida, 74 or some similar procedure." 5 Such a proce-
dure would for all practical purposes solve the delay problem by
permitting the litigant to by-pass the lower state courts and present
directly to the highest state court propounded questions of state
law." If limited to use by federal appellate courts, as it is sug-
gested it should be, this procedure dearly preserves to the litigant his
right to have the facts found by the federal court 7 7 In addition,
the state courts would be limited to consideration of matters of direct
concern to the federal court. And, finally, the federal court would
not be reduced, in a diversity case, to a 'sterile monitor," 78 for it
would be the basic instrument of the resolution of the entire case in
specifying the state law question within the framework of the rele-
vant facts and legal issues to the state's highest authority. Given the
speed, economy, and authority of the certification device, most of
the problems involved with use of abstention in both federal ques-
tion cases and diversity cases can be considerably diminished, if not
solved altogether."
1 7 4 FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1961), authorizing the Florida Supreme Court to pro-
vide by rule for the answering of questions concerning state law certified to it by fed-
eral courts. See FLA. APP. R. 4.61.
175 Although certification will be referred to in this discussion, it is assumed that
similar results could be achieved by a more expeditious declaratory judgment process.
Only seventeen states have intra-jurisdictional certification devices (see Note, supra note
173, at 349 nA0), and in these states an alteration to provide for inter-jurisdictional
certification should not be difficult to implement. In the remaining jurisdictions, where
it might be felt that adoption of such a procedure would be a radical change, alteration
of existing declaratory judgment procedures should be able to accomplish substantially
the same results.
176 The Florida rule provides for this. FLA. APP. R. 4.61(b).
177 The Florida rule also requires this. FLA. APP. R1 4.61 (a).
178 See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
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"That was quite a dissertation, and, needless to say, I have some
questions concerning it. Given the facts that only eleven states pro-
vide for advisory opinions,' that the Supreme Court of Texas re-
fused to answer a question following abstention on advisory-opinion
grounds180 under its Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,181 and
that it is not unlikely that the other forty states which have adopted
that act will follow suit, it seems to me that the most serious ob-
jection to a certification procedure is that it seems to call for ad-
visory opinions. So can we finally discuss that issue now?"
"I am pleased to be able to say yes."
"At last! Well, it seems to me that the issue divides itself into
two facets. The first is the problem of abstractness due to the sever-
ing of the legal question from the factual situation out of which it
arose. Would you begin with that?"
"Surely, and the answer is fairly simple: make findings of fact
an indispensable part of the certificate, thereby necessitating the
posing of the question in its detailed factual setting and also provide
for inclusion of as much of the record as is necessary for a complete
understanding of the question to be answered. This will eliminate
the tendency towards giving a generalized answer, which tendency
would exist if the questions were presented without a specific focus,
absent the requirement of non-abstractness."
"But what if the record is so complicated as to make it impossi-
ble to isolate particular questions and the facts particularly relevant
thereto?"
"In such instances the entire record should be sent to the state
court, including all legal issues and findings of fact. If this is neces-
sary for a complete understanding of the issues involved and in order
to give a concrete setting to the interrelated issues, then this should
be done."
"Even with a record, might not a court feel that it is not settling
'79Note, supra note 173, at 356 n.81; Note, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 1041, 1045
(1962). For a discussion and evaluation of the use of advisory opinions in these states,
see Stevens, Advisory Opinions - Present Status and an Evaluation, 34 WASH. L. REV.
1 (1959).
180 See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
18 1 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 1 (1965).
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an actual dispute and thus feel that the question is still abstract?"
"It might, but the court could have the parties file briefs, and, if
the question is complex enough, they can be allowed oral argu-
ments."'182
"Then your point is that as long as the question is presented in
its factual setting, and by the parties as well as the certifying court, it
is not abstract?"
"Exactly. The question will have arisen out of a given state of
facts which the state court will have before it. How could it be ab-
stract under these circumstances?"
"I am convinced that it could not. But there still is the second
facet of the issue, that is, the advisory opinion concept itself: the
requirement of a real case or controversy. How do we dispose of
this problem?"
"An advisory opinion is one which lacks responsiveness to par-
ticular parties and does not directly affect the parties' rights because
it is unessential to the disposition of the case and is thus neither
binding upon the parties nor determinative of an actual dispute."
It is difficult to see how the state's answer to a certified question fails
in any of these respects. First of all, the answer is responsive to a
question which is presented in actual litigation and which is pre-
sumably posed non-abstractly. Second, and most important, the de-
cision will finally determine and be res judicata to the rights of real
litigants as to the state law question answered."8 4 And, third, since
the answer will bind and be res judicata as to the state rights of
specific parties, there is no reason why it should not be given stare
decisis effect. Thus it is extremely difficult to understand why such
an opinion would be advisory.
"Of course if the state opinion were an advisory one, incorpora-
tion of it into the federal court decision would seem to make that de-
cision a forbidden advisory opinion too. This would be especially
true in diversity cases. But as long as the state's opinion is not advi-
182 Florida's rules require the filing of briefs, (FLA. APP. R. 4.61 (g)) and provide.
that the parties may be granted oral argument. (FLA. APP. L 4.61 (h)). See note 174
Sapi'a.
183 See HART & WECHSLER, TH FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERA SYSTEM
77-79 (1953).
184 See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
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sory, as I have suggested, and provided that it is a final adjudication
of the federal litigants' state rights and will be given stare decisis
effect in the state, the federal court would seem to no more violate
the case or controversy requirement by incorporation of such a de-
cision than it does when it incorporates under Erie any other final
state adjudication of parties' state rights."' 5
"Well, although I must say you disposed of that issue rather
well, I do have a few more questions as to your initial statement
concerning the use of certification as a solution to some of the ab-
stention problems. First, why would you limit certification to use
by the appellate courts? If at an early stage of the trial, or even at
pre-trial, it becomes apparent that there is a doubtful state law ques-
don which the state court will eventually have to answer, would it
not cause undue delay - the elimination of which is itself a prime
reason for the use of certification - to have an entire trial before
the question can be answered authoritatively?"
"The certification procedure is not perfect and will not remove
all of the problems abstention creates. Rather, it is hoped that
those which remain will be substantially reduced by the use of cer-
tification, at least to the point at which they do not outweigh the
advantages to be gained from the use of abstention. Taking a bal-
ancing approach, then, the advantages of limiting certification to
use by appellate courts more than outweigh the disadvantage of pos-
sible unnecessary delay. First, this device assures the litigant his
federal fact-finding forum and gives him a chance to sharpen his
legal issues before the federal court. Questions which may appear
early in a trial may disappear before the end of it; 86 other questions
may not become clear or appear at all until the trial is nearly over.
By demanding a complete trial, not only will there be a full oppor-
tunity for the litigant to have all relevant issues developed and ir-
relevant ones disposed of but in addition he will be saved the consid-
erable expense and delay of having another question appropriate for
the state court, and thus for abstention, emerge after he has already
been to the state court on an initial question and has returned to the
district court. Second, a district court record will give the court of
185 But see Note, 40 TExAs L. REv. 1041 (1962).
1 8 6 In Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), revrd on re-
hearing, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), the certified question would have been ren-
dered moot by a jury finding of a lack of causal connection between the deceased's can-
cer and his smoking of the defendant's cigarettes.
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appeals, whose judges are not likely to be as familiar with the state
law as the district judge, something from which to work in order to
enable them to more easily determine the existence of a truly doubt-
ful state law question necessary to a disposition of the case; and if
they find such a question, the record will be of great aid in drawing
a certificate containing only relevant issues and facts in a non-
abstract manner. This will also assure the state court of a complete
record as to the issues and facts relevant to the question it is asked to
answer - elements we found basic to answering the advisory opin-
ion issue. A third factor in favor of this device is that assuring the
litigant of a complete trial in the district court considerably removes
the risk that the litigant might be discouraged from invoking federal
jurisdiction at all, in the belief that he could get speedier relief in
the state courts. Finally, the state courts will more readily accept
certification if their workload is expanded by getting questions only
from federal appellate courts rather than from the numerous district
courts."
"Those are good points. It does seem that the possibilities of
delay would be greater if the district courts were also allowed to
certify. And I just thought of another point! Do you recall my
asking you about the equal ability of the state court judge and the
federal district court judge to predict state law, and your answer that
there was an inherent inequality because the federal judge was not
subject to state court review?"' 87
"Yes."
"Well, does it not seem that your objection is practically removed
when certification is utilized and limited to use by appellate courts?
With certification, the district judge will be under similar circum-
stances as the state judge, for he will know his decision is subject to
review in the highest state court through use of the certification pro-
cedure by the appellate court. Would it not seem, then, that since
abstention is at least in part designed to prevent decisions of unset-
tled state law questions by federal courts not subject to state court
review and because certification does in effect make such decisions
subject to such review, under a certification procedure abstention is
no longer needed at the district court level?"
187 See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
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"That is a very interesting point, and your argument surely
seems valid. Let me add that the lack of any need for abstention,
at the district court level, given the certification procedure, surely
makes any added delay at that level due to abstention even more of
an unnecessary burden to the litigants."
"Would the considerations be any different if the district court
were a three-judge court?"' 88
"The considerations are not different, but because the decisions
of such courts are appealable only to the Supreme Court 89 it would
seem that three-judge district courts should be allowed to certify
questions to the state courts. However, since the reasons given
above for the need of a district court record apply and are equally
compelling here, certification should be limited to questions which
the three-judge court had already decided."
"Could not the Supreme Court certify questions arising in cases
being appealed from three-judge courts?"
"Yes, it could, and the Court has itself used the Florida certifica-
tion procedure to obtain answers to questions of Florida law.'
However, since the Court is already overloaded, it would be an un-
warranted additional burden to have it determine whether to certify
as well as to draft certificates in all three-judge cases. This is espe-
cially so since it seems a reasonable alternative to allow the three-
judge district court to certify as long as it previously decides the
questions, given the facts that, first, such courts have a special inter-
est in having unsettled state law questions determined because their
jurisdiction is limited to cases seeking injunctive relief against state
statutes challenged on federal constitutional grounds'' and, second,
since their jurisdiction is limited, they are not convened so often that
allowing them to certify will constitute an unreasonable burden on
the state courts from which answers are sought."
188 See 28 U.S.C. § 2281-84 (1964); HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 183,
at 846-55.
18928 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
190 See, e.g., Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963); Aldrich v. Al-
drich, 375 U.S. 75 (1963).
191 See 28 U.S.C. 5§ 2281-84 (1964); HART & WECHSLEt, op. cit. supra note 183,
at 846-55.
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"I would like to pose a question regarding the ability of a district
court to abstain if there is no certification procedure, inasmuch as
only one state has such a procedure now. Under such circum-
stances, would you still deny the district court the right to initiate
abstention? And, if so, will this not cause considerable delay where
a district court is reversed by a court of appeals for not abstaining in
a case which dearly calls for application of the'doctrine?"
"As to your first question, the answer is yes - for the same rea-
sons we do not want to allow a district court to use certification. 192
As to your second question, the same reasons which compel our
willingness to assume this risk of extra delay in certification situa-
tions are equally applicable to abstention without certification."193
"But if the district court is not permitted to abstain, what will
happen in federal question cases to the policy of avoiding constitu-
tional questions? Is not this policy equally applicable to district
courts as well as to other courts?"
"Yes it is, but it is simply outweighed here by other policies,
such as the need for complete district court records in order to avoid
the advisory opinion problem and the understandable reluctance of
state courts to accept certification if it would result in their being
deluged through its use by questions coming from the numerous dis-
trict courts. In addition, with final determination of the use of cer-
tification being reposed in the appellate courts, constitutional ques-
tions may still be ultimately avoided, so the policy would be main-
tained."
"Well, we seem to have exhausted our discussion of the reasons
for limiting certification and abstention to initiation by appellate
courts. One final question now. Given the fact that certification
would seem to make abstention much less objectionable and thus in-
crease the benefits derivable from its use, it would surely seem to be
desirable that it be made generally available. 94 How could we. ac-
complish this, and should it be done at the federal or the state
level?"
192 See text accompanying notes 186-88 supra.
193 Ibid.
194 See Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court
Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960).
1966]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
"It is doubtful whether this could be accomplished through the
federal government. Mr. Justice Douglas indicated in England his
doubt of the Court's power to compel a state to accept the certifica-
tion procedure,' and the case law is far from persuasive that Con-
gress could do it. 9 ' Given the fact that certification might require
drastic changes in a state's judicial procedures, even to the extent of
necessitating constitutional amendments, 1' and that a state might
prefer (and be more willing to accept!) some type of procedure
which would not constitute such a drastic change,'98 the states them-
selves are more likely to be in a better position to establish workable
mechanisms. But, most important, even if certification could be
forced on the states, it would be much the wiser course 99 to leave to
the states the task of developing it. The entire procedure being de-
signed to enhance federal-state cooperation, coercing the states to
accept certification is not likely to further such cooperation." '
"I certainly agree with that. Yet how are we to get the states
to take the necessary steps to initiate the procedure?"
"I think we already learned the best answer to that when it was
pointed out that the states are not likely to be overly disturbed
about the non-application of res judicata, because they are likely to
share, along with the federal judiciary, the desire for 'furthering the
harmonious relation between state and federal authority,'2 ' which
195 '"We cannot require the States to provide... a [certification] procedure .... "
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 434 (1964) (con-
curring opinion).
196 Certification poses considerably different problems than did the provisions in-
volved in cases like Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), where the Court upheld the
power of Congress to require state courts to entertain suits under the Emergency Price
Control Act, 58 Stat. 645 (1945), on grounds that the existing judicial machinery of the
state provided the means to answer the questions posed and to grant the remedies afforded
by the federal act. Certification, on the other hand, may necessitate that an entirely new
procedural framework be provided within the state.
197 See Note, supra note 173, at 351-57.
198 See note 175 supra.
199 Certainly politically more desirable!
200 Even though certification is considerably more efficient than declaratory judg-
ment actions, lack of cooperation between the two judicial systems could produce con-
siderable delay even with the use of certification. This lack of cooperation was un-
doubtedly a factor contributing to the delay experienced with the use of the Florida cer-
tification procedure in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., which began on May 20, 1957.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the jury verdict of the district court, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir.
1959), which was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court, ordering certification on June
13, 1960, 363 U.S. 207 (1960). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions
to the Florida Supreme Court on August 12, 1960, which answered the certificate on
October 18, 1961, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961). The Fifth Circuit decided the case
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is, after all, the very basic purpose behind the abstention doc-
trine."' As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in England,°" federal-
ism has always presented basic problems arising out of the dash be-
tween our two systems of government, and there has been a constant
attempt to keep these conflicts at a minimum. Erie is a good exam-
ple, and the abstention doctrine is another. But, as is inevitable in
such situations, it is found that solutions we develop for a particular
problem often produce other problems, and so it was with absten-
ton:... it had advantages in easing conflicts in federalism, but it
created other problems in that area. We have found a way to im-
plement the doctrine so as to solve some of these latter problems.
Even further implementation can be achieved through cooperation,
such as discretionary use of certification on the part of both the state
courts asked to answer questions and the federal courts in using the
procedure.20 5 All this can only work to increase the advantages and
decrease the disadvantages to both federal and state systems in the
use of the abstention doctrine and thus make cooperative judicial
federalism even more of a reality." 6 In short, it is a device which
will lower the price of our federalism instead of, as Mr. Justice
Douglas fears, making abstention an unnecessary price to pay for
it207 and 'something of a Frankenstein.'0 8 This being the case,
there is no reason to expect that every effort will not be taken - on
both sides - to achieve this goal."
'There is not much more one can say, except that I hope you are
right! After so 'smoothly' doing away with the problems of absten-
tion, I suppose there is not much more to discuss."
"As you know, the law will never leave you with nothing to
discuss! Nonetheless, I think we have done enough for one session."
again on June 19, 1963, 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963), and the final decision was
reached on May 18, 1964, where the Supreme Court again reversed the Fifth Circuit,
377 U.S. 179 (1964).201 Raikoad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
202 See text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
203 375 U.S. 411, 431-32 (1964) (concurring opinion).
204 "1 was a member of the Court that launched Pullmau and sent it on its way.
But if I had realized the creature it was to become, my doubts would have been far
deeper than they were." Id. at 425.
205 See Note, supra note 173, at 359-60.
206 See Kurland, supra note 194.
2 0 7 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 426 (1964)
(concurring opinion).
208 Id. at 429.
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